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ABSTRACT
In the first parts of my thesis I explore two philosophical programs
in the area of referential semantics, namely, rigid designation accounts
of proper names and naturalistic theories of truth. I conclude with an
inquiry into the theory of truth for mathematics and its relationship to
mathematical Platonism.
In Part One, I confront Kripke's well-known views with Quine's pro-
posal that proper names correspond to a kind of predicate. I argue that
the belief that proper names are rigid designators is unjustified and
that many questions about the reference of terms in various possible
worlds have no determinate answer. I take issue with Kripke's emphasis
on the question, "How is the reference of names determined?", and suggest
that it reflects dubious philosophical presuppositions.
In Part Two, I note that Field envisions a theory of truth as a
natural property to be employed in a scientific account of the nature of
knowledge. I explain how his account reworks the machinery of Tarski's
theory of truth, making use of putative semantic relations between names
and their referents and predicates and their extensions. It thereby com-
mits itself to a natural relation of reference that underlies all language.
I argue that nothing in our ordinary notion of referring provides evidence
for such a relation and object to specific aspects of Field's account.
Finally, I describe a conflict that appears to Benacerraf between the
requirements of a semantics for the language of mathematics and those of a
plausible account of mathematical knowledge. Concentrating on the seman-
tical side, I argue that no unified semantic theory should be expected.
Nevertheless, an explanatory account of truth for mathematical statements
is available, in the form of a theoretical definition of truth, as firs~
formulated by Tarski. I maintain that the correctness of this theory of
truth is not a genuine issue in the philosophy of mathematics. In parti-
cular, the theory does not entail or even lend support to Platonism.
Thesis Supervisor: George Boalos,
Professor of Philosophy
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SENSE ABOUT PROPER NAMES
7
8In a thought provoking footnote to his important work, Naming and
Necessity, Saul Kripke exempts from his criticism of the classical the-
ory of proper names a proposal of Quine's that names correspond to a
kind of predicate. Kripke claims that Quine's proposal leaves the pro-
ject that he undertakes in his essay ess~ntially unchanged. I want to
investigate whether that claim is true. Quine's suggestion has not been
as widely noticed as have other views on naming. Perhaps many share the
suspicion Kripke enunciates that the proposal is not "a substantive
1theory of the reference of names. 1I Quine's own disclaimers reinforce
that suspicion. One reason that I want to discuss Quine's proposal is
that I think that it can develop enough philosophical flesh to provide
a serious alternative. But perhaps a deeper reason is that I believe
that considering the problems Kripke discusses with Quine's proposal in
mind will undermine--to good effect--many of the analytical tools that
Kripke employs in his discussion.
In the first part of this paper I will explain exactly what Quine
has proposed. I will contrast a narrower with a broader construal of
1 Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessit¥ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1980), p. 29, n. 5; originally in Semantics of Natural
Language, ed~ Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1972), pp. 253-355.
9the proposal and relate the contrast to issues about the natura of
philosophical analysis. And I will criticize some of the detail of
Quine's exposition. In the second part I will raise some of Kripke's
questions about naming and reference on the supposition that names are
predicative. After extending the notion of rigid designation in a natu-
ral way, I will try to generate doubts about certain widely accepted
cases of rigid designation. Doing so will emphasize the importance that
Kripke attaches to the question, "How is the reference of names deter-
mined?" In the third part I will criticize typical theoretical answers
to this question and suggest that the question embodies dubious philo-
sophical presuppositions. Finally I will suggest ways of reformulating
the question that would enable Quine to answer it.
I • PROPER NAMES A1~D PREDICATES
Russell's theory of descriptions is a well-kn.own proposal for ex-
plaining the logical form of sentences containing definite descriptions.
Under the proposal such sentences are analyzed, to use the term that
Russell himself used, into certain replacement sentences which exhibit
their own logical structure. Russell claimed that the replacement sen-
tence in each case expresses the same proposition as the original sen-
tence, this being the standard of a correct analysis. The key feature
of the proposal is that the replacement sentences contain no definite
descriptions; rather, certain constructions out of the quantifiers of
first-order logic and the identity relation do the work of the definite
!O
descriptions. The replacement sentence is not constructed by substitut-
ing an equivalent phrase for each definite description in the original.
Russell denied that a correct analysis of sentences containing descrip-
tions could be given this way. No definition of definite descriptions
in isolation is possible; they are to be defined in context. Russell
took himself to have satisfactorily elucidated the logical function of
definite descriptions if he could give a systematic method of produc-
ing, for each given sentence, an equivalent sentence with no definite
descriptions. He specifically denied that definite descriptions, as
constituents of the sentences in which they occur, have meanings of
their own. Instead, sentences containing them are seen to be meaning-
ful and to have the meanings that they do have by considering the
meanings of the replacement sentences when the analysis is completed.
Stated thus in terms of meanings, these claims seem unreasonable. They
are better understood rephrased as follows, keeping in mind Russell's
doctrine of propositions. The proposition expressed by a sentence con-
taining a description is not a function of the reference of the descrip-
tion. Such a sentence nonetheless does express a proposition, and we
can tell what proposition it expresses by considering the proposition
expressed by the replacement sentence issuing from the analysis. 2
2 The original appearance of the theory of descriptions was in
Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind, 14 (1905), pp. 479-493; rpt. in
his Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin,
1956), pp. 39-56. For a more narrowly focused presentation, see Ber-
trand Russell, "Descriptions," (ch. 16 of) Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy.(London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), pp. 167-180.
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Without going into much of the detail of Russell's theory, let us
notice how it applies to a simple example. The sentence,
( 1) The teacher of Plato was bald,
is analyzed by the theory as,
(2) (Hx) (Vy)«y taught Plato ++ y = x) & x was bald).
The analysis shows that to assert (1) is to assert that something both
taught Plato and was bald and, what's more, nothing else taught Plato.
The replacement sentence (2), unlike (1), contains no definite descrip-
tions; nevertheless, no part of (2) corresponds to the description,
'the teacher of Plato'.
In various of his writings, W.V. Quine has suggested that we use
Russell's analysis as a model for eliminating from our discourse all
singular terms, not only definite descriptions, but what philosophers
3
call proper names as well. The sentence,
(3) Socrates was bald,
is exactly like our earlier example save for having the proper name
'Socrates' in place of the description 'the teacher of Plato'. We
3 Willard Van Orman Quine, "On What There Is," Review of Meta-
physics, 2 (1948); rpt. in his From A Logical Point of View-:-2nd ed.,
rev. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 1-19; see
pp. 7-8 in particular. Methods of Logic, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt,
19/2), pp. 230-234. Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press,
1960), pp. 176-190. Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 25-26.,
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ordinarily suppose that each sentence attributes baldness to a particu-
lar person, as it happens, the same person in both cases. Whatever else
the two expressions do in their respective sentences, in (1) 'the
teacher of Plato' identifies that person, while in (3) 'Socrates' iden-
tifies him. Quine's suggestion is designed to preserve the similarity
of logical form that (3) thus apparently bears to (1).
The Russell analysis of example (1) is an instance of the quanti-
ficational schema,
(4) (a x) (Vy) «Fy -+-+ y = x) & Gx).
If he can find an analysis of (3) that also is an instance of that
schema, Quine will have captured that apparent similarity; he will have
shown that the two indeed share a single logical structure at some non-
trivial level of analysis. To find the appropriate instantiation of
the predicate letters of the schema, it is clear enough that we should
begin by supplanting the predicate letter 'G' with the predicate 'was
bald' just as before. But with what can we supplant the other predi-
cate letter? The novelty of Quine's suggestion lies in his answer to
this question. Supplant the schematic 'F', he says, with the predicate,
'= Socrates', yielding,
(5) (3x) (Vy) «y = Socrates ++ y = x) & x was bald).
This maneuver is possible not only in this case, but in
any other, because of the logical equivalence of any sentence
. a . • . with ' (~x) (./Y) «y = a ++ y = x) & x . . .)'
so long as , a' has referential position in . . . a . . ,. .
1~
Since '(Vy) (y = a -Ho- y = a)' is a valid formula, from '. • . a .
from that, so long as 'y' is not free in
we can derive , (Vy) (y = a -H-- y = a) & a . • . ,
. • • a
and
,
. ,
we derive , (Vy) «y = a ++ y = a) & a ...)' by a well-
known rule of passage. An existential generalization yields
, @x) (Vy) «y = a +-+ y = x) & • x •.• )'. On the other hand, if we
have '@x) (Vy) «y = a ++ y = x) & • • • x . • .)', an existential in-
stantiation yields '(Vy)«y = a ++ y = b) & b !) " and a uni-
versal instantiation yields '(b = a ++ b = b) & • b ,. . The
theory of identity gives us 'b = b' and thus 'b = a & ••• b .
Since 'b' has referential position in ' b ••• ', a substitution
again licensed by identity theory and an easy truth-functional simpli-
fication give us
equivalence.
• • • a • •
,
. . We have proved the desired logical
Quine bases his recommendation of this treatment of proper names
on several technical advantages. One advaatage accrues in what Quine
calls singular inference. Proper names are commonly treated in systems
of formal deduction as individual constants or, what comes to the same
thing, in systems that do not have individual constants, as free vari-
ables. The usual rules of inference provide for instantiation of a
universally quantified variable with an individual constant and for
existential generalization of an individual constant. Of course these
rules, like all deductive rulus, are supposed to preserve truth. Un-
fortunately, the application of these rules can generate false con-
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elusions from true premises when an individual constant is schema-
tic for a proper name which happens not to name anything. Flom
'(Vx)(x = x)', an axiom of identity, one can derive 'Pegasus = Pegasus',
and from that, 'Gx)(x = Pegasus)', which says that something is iden-
tical to Pegasus and which is evidently false. A somewhat more subtle
deduction derives the false conclusion,
Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street,
from the evidently true premises,
Wx)(the detective adventures of x were
described by Doyle ~ x lived on Baker Street),
and,
Wx)(x = Sherlock Holmes ~ the detective
adventures of x were described by Doyle).
What is required is the instantiation of 'x' by 'Sherlock Holmes' in
both ?remises as well as in the previously mentioned axiom of identity.
These instantiations are licensed by the rule for individual constants
given above. Then two applications of modus~~ give the false
conclusion. (Similar inferences with '0/0' as the problematic singular
term are familiar mathematical fallacies.) In both examples what has
gone wrong is that the proper name fails to be the name of anything,
whereas the proof of soundness for quantificational proof procedures
only guarantees them under all interpretations of the individual con-
15
stants and other uninterpreted symbols. But an interpretation assigns
something rather than nothing -to every individual constant.
A careful treatment of proper names as individual constants
requires that we assure ourselves that all names name something before
applying the rules of inference for individual constants to them.
Quine's proposal relieves the rules for individual constants of this
care and instead makes necessary the explicit statement of a premise
asserting the existence of something named by the proper name. In a
Quinean rendering of the second example, 'Ba' does not represent the
conclusion,
Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street,
and '(VX)(x = a + Dx)' does not represent the premise,
If anybody was Sherlock Holmes, his detective
adventures were described by Doyle.
For both premise and conclusion more complicated schemata are required,
such that the conclusion does not follow from the given premises with-
out an additional premise, '(~x)(vy)(y = Sherlock Holmes ++ y = x)'.
Since the latter is false, the deduction countenanced by the usual
rules of inference is no counterexample.
Quine's views on the philosophical point of the proposal as
described so far enable him to avoid certain problems that arise when
we put the proposal to work in service of broader philosophical
purposes. Because of his impatience with the notions of meaning and
synonymy and proposition, he has no interest in the question whether
the replacement (5) means the same as (3) or whether it expresses the
same proposition as (3). Something of that sort rnu.at hold for it to
serve as an analysis in the traditional Russellian sense. Quine
recasts the task of analyzing the puzzling or logically troublesome
locutions in ordinary discourse into the task of regimenting, as he
16
calls it, ordinary discourse into such a form that the logical puzzles
do not arise. 4 This is but one example of his refashioning the philo-
sophical program of Russell and the logical positivists to accommodate
the quite devastating criticisms that appear in his early papers cul-
minating in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Regimentation is constrained
not by the preservation of meaning but by the fulfillment of the
purposes that the ordinary locutions were originally advanced to
serve, fulfilling them in language appropriate for scientific theo-
rizing. Simplification of theory provides the rationale for regi-
mentation in case after case, and economy in the rules of deduction,
all the while keeping them rigidly mechanical, is the frequent
criterion of simplicity. So goes his account of the virtue of the
reformed treatment of singular inference that we have outlined, and
so also goes his familiar rejection of constructions with referen-
tially opaque positions. In a hopeful paragraph Quine leaves the
question of whether the regimented locutions do serve the purposes
4 See Section 33 of Quine, Word and Object, entitled, "Aims and
Claims of Regimentation."
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intended to the atheoretic judgment of the theorist. He writes,
. • • on the one hand there is theoretical deduction and
on the other hand there is the work of paraphrasing
ordinary language into the theory. The latter job is the
less tidy of the two, but still it will usually present
little difficulty to one familiar with the canonical
notation. For normally he himself is the one who has
uttered, as part of some present job, the sentence of
ordinary language concerned; and he can then judge out-
right whether his ends are served by the paraphrase. 5
Purposes of scientific theorizing are the only purposes that
Quine has much interest in serving. A consideration of the character
of scientific theory as Quine sees it reveals why logical equivalence
rather than any stricter equivalence usually guarantees adequacy of
paraphrase. In his view most sentences in a scientific theory merely
mediate between observation sentences. They can do so in a more or
less elegant way, thus his present concern with simplicity, and they
can do so with more or less violence to our inherited conceptual
scheme, thus the concern with conservatism enunciated in other con-
texts. The job of mediating is done as well by a logical equivalent
as by any given sentence, for the threads of mediation consist of
logical relations: what other sentences imply and are implied by
the given sentence. Since logical equivalence preserves these logical
relations under substitution, replacing the ordinary sentence by a
logically equivalent regimented sentence is guaranteed to yield a theory
5 Quine, Word and pbject, p. 159. See also the first paragraph
lying wholly within p. 160.
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as suitable as the given theory •. The question of sameness of
meaning,. which Quine regards as spurious anyway, is completely avoided.
In the case at hand Quine provides a proof of logical equivalence
between the unregimented sentence containing proper names in any
referential position and the regimented replacement in which proper
names occur only to the right of the identity sign.
Quine's program of regimentation will not prove satisfying to any
whose interests lie precisely in determining the logical structure of
the unregimented sentences occurring in our ordinary discourse and
in determining in particular the contribution of proper names to that
structure. Supposing that our interest lies there, we want indeed to
ask whether (5) is an analysis of (3). An argument for logical equiv-
alence does not show that it is, for logical equivalence is too loose
a relation to insure synonymy or, on most views, sameness of propo-
sition expressed. All pairs of logically valid sentences (or of
contradictions) are logically equivalent, yet only on extreme views
do all valid sentences express the same proposition. One can show
that the sentence,
If the moon is made of green cheese, then nothing is what it is,
is logically equivalent to the sentence,
The moon is not made of green cheese,
but no one who takes meaning seriously thinks that they mean the same
thing. Perhaps (probably) when pressed we cannot effectively determine
19
identity of propositions expressed or sameness of meaning. If it
follows that we cannot give usable standards for what constitutes an
analysis, we might more modestly ask whether the logical form of (3) is
indeed that displayed by the schematic (4). Is the coarsest structure
of (3) an existential quantification? And does the presence of proper
names in referential position always mark a sentence as a particular
kind of existential generalization?6 All of these questions exceed
the reach of anything that Quine argued for in his theory of names.
Taking these questions seriously immediately calls to our attention
the fact that in (5) the proper name 'Socrates' is not eliminated at
all; it still appears, this time after the identity sign. And in
every case, carrying out the transformations indicated by the schematic
proof of pages 12 and 13 merely moves the proper names to this char-
acteristic position. We said that the point of Russell's theory of
descriptions was to analyze descriptions away by producing equivalent
sentences in which no descriptions occur. If we want an analysis of
sentences with proper names that will explicate their logical function,
we had better not be satisfied with a further batch of sentences them-
selves containing proper names.
Even though Quine shuns analysis, he addresses himself to the
issue just raised because he seeks another benefit from his regimen-
tatioo besides that of rationalizing singular inference. He employs
6 In Essay Three (pp. 95~98, below) I raise doubts about even
these seemingly more modest questions.
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it in understanding existence claims. The logical structure of
sentences affirming or denying existence has long puzzled phi10-
sophers. Making sense of denials has especially led to extravagances
7
of philosophical theory. The traditional puzzle is, how can the
sentence,
-(6) Pegasus does not exist,
state something that is true? If there is no Pegasus, then 'Pegasus'
names nothing. So what is the sentence about? In no true case of a
denial of existence is there anything for the relevant sentence to
deny existence of. In Word and Object, Quine approaches the problem
by way of asking whether 'Pegasus' has referential position in (6).8
In false cases, analogues of (6) survive the test of substituting for
the name other names or descriptions of the same entity. All alike
are false. But if that position is referential, then 'does not exist'
is a predicate and one with empty extension. We suppose that the truth
of predications depends on (or at least goes with) membership of the
subject of predication in the extension of the predicate~ And then 'does
not exist' cannot be true of anything and thus not of Pegasus.
Suppose we take (6) to be 'not (Pegasus exists)' and apply Quine's
method of regimenting proper names to the fragment governed by 'not'.
7 For Quine's amusing account of some of these, see "On What
There Is."
8 Pp. 176-177 and 179.
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(Of course the proof of logical equivalence requires that the proper
names have referential position, and we have just conceded some doubt
about the present case, but let us ignore that for now.) This
instantiation of the replacement schema produces,
not (~x)(Vy)«y = Pegasus ++ y = x) & x exists).
The second conjunct ('x exists') of the part of this sentence governed
by the quantifiers seems simply redundant. If we drop it we get,
(7) not (ax) (Vy) (y = Pegasus ++ y = x),
which presumably is to be read as 'nothing is Pegasus', or 'There is no
such thing as Pegasus'. This analysis of sentences like (6) does not
originate with Quine, but he is happy to embrace it as a second benefit
of his proposal. More needs to be said though, for the problem about
referential position recurs with (7). 'Pegasus' has referential
position in (7) as normally parsed, and so long as (7) is false that is
not puzzling. But again, what if (7) is true? (I take it that it is
true.) As Quine puts it,
[T]here is just something wrong about admi.tting that 'Pegasus'
can ever have purely referential position in truths or false-
hoods; for the intuitive idea behind "purely referential
position" was supposed to be that the term is used purely to
specify its object, for the rest of the sentence to say
something about. 9
9 Quine, Word and Object, pp. 176-177.
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We have found two difficulties with the presence of proper names in
the replacement sentences--an obstacle to the claims of Russellian
analysis and a problem about referential position. Only the second of
these worries Quine since he does not intend to explicate the role of
proper names in ordinary discourse anyway, but it motivates a 8ignifi-
10
cant extension of his proposal. Quine suggests that we not consider
the predicate '= Socrates' (or '= Pegasus') to be composed of an
identity sign followed by a proper name or to be composed of any logical
materials at all. We are to take it as logically simple. The 'is' in
'is Socrates' is merely a copula. What appears as '= Socrates' in the
regimentation is a monadic predicate which, for logical purposes, has
no structure. The predicate happens to be true of Socrates and of
nothing else. In some passages Quine suggests that we use an alterna-
tive formulation--"socratizesn , "pegasizestl--to remind ourselves of
11this. On this account there is no problem about the position of a
singular term 'Pegasus' in the denial of existence (7), for no singular
term occurs; '= Pegasus' is a predicate, i.e., a general term, and the
10 Quine is not quite candid about this. Remember that singular
inferences are guaranteed by the proposal even if proper names remain in
the regimented sentences. A conclusion schema correctly representing a
sentence whose proper names purport to refer can be derived only from
premises with appropriate existential force. I must acknowledge a third
benefit which Quine thinks quite important, the closing of truth-value
gaps. This too requires the extension. I have chosen not to discuss it
because the issues are similar to those discussed with respect to exis-
tence claims.
11 Quine, "On What There Is," p. 8.
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notion of referential position is not applicable.
It is time that our attention revert to the proof of the elimi-
nability of proper names set out on pages 12 and 13. The careful reader
12
will have noticed that the proof given is not exactly Quine's proof.
Oddly enough, Quine's own replacement schelna is '(lIx) (x = a & • • • x •
• •)'; the constructions that make for uniqueness have been omitt~d~ I
bothered to spell out the proof in order to show that they can be
included. Our proof provides for a replacement algorithm exactly
paralleling that of Russell for definite descriptions, and it is only
slightly more complicated than Quin~'s proof. Our version has the
virtue of preserving and explicating the similarity of logical structure
between (1) and (3). So long as we care about attempting a real analy-
sis, that seems a virtue worth embracing. Quine is interested enough in
the ordinary meaning of proper names to acknowledge that his version
13does not carryover "the purport of uniqueness". He justifies his
version with a comparison to certain other general terms. 'Cousin of'
expresses a relation that in fact is symmetrical, and we commonly appeal
to its symmetry in the course of deduction. Whether the symmetry of
cousinhood derives from the meaning of 'cousin' or from contingencies of
nature is an open question not easily settled. It is unclear what con-
siderations should count towards settling it. Quine regularly appeals
12 Quine's own version is in Word and Object, p. 178.
13 Quine, Word and Object, p. 182.
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to economy of logical theory in these cases, and I am sympathetic to
that appeal. But in the present case no economy is noted, and I am
unable to discover one. Since that algorithm works as smoothly which
generates a replacement sentence requiring uniqueness of reference of
proper names for truth, it seems the better choice. Nothing Quine says
undermines our intuition that the original (3) impli~s that there is
;
exactly one Socrates as much as (1) implies that there is exactly one
teacher of Plato. 14 !
C6ncerningeither proof--Quine's original or the revised version
above--two objections need to be aired. Both objections arise as a
result of Quine's parsing the replacement sentence so that '= Socrates'
is a logically simple predicate. In the first place the proof appeals
explicitly in its second naIf to the axioms of identity theory. The
substitution of 'a' for a once existentially ·quantified ..free variable,
yielding the schematic ' ••• a ••• " crucially depends on the
identity of the referent of 'a' with the referent of that variable.
Indeed it is thdt very substitution which requires the limitation to
contexts in which the proper name has referential position. But if the
predicate '= a' has no structure, then the symbol '=' occurring in it
does not express the identity relation, and the axioms of identity are
irrelevant. Taking it as the identity sign is simply an equivocation.
14 Quine's exposition in Methods of Logic, p. 233, does require
uniqueness. There the method of paraphrasing for proper names is
conflated with the method for definite descriptions, using the iota
operator, which implies uniqueness, for both.
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And half of the proof no longer goes through when we avoid this equivo-
cation.
The second objection is similar. Both halves of the proof treat
'a' in '= a' as an individual constant, which can be existentially
generalized in the first half and which can occur in an instance of the
substitution axiom of identity in the second half. Again, if '= a' is
logically simple and contains no occurrence of a singular term, treating
'a' as an individual constant is an equivocation. This objection can be
generalized to avoid depending on Quine's suggestion that '= a' be
considered simple. Whether that predicate is simple or not, in the
proof rules of inference for individual constants are applied to 'a',
which is schematic for the proper name under consideration. The logical
nature of proper names is just what the proof is intended to clarify.
To assume that they obey the logical laws for individual constants is
to beg the very question at hand.
It must be said in Quine's defense that it is far from clear what
he intends the point of his proof to be. We have portrayed it as an
argument for the logical equivalence of (3) and (5) and of all analo-
gous pairs represented by the schemata of the proof. So understood, it
is intended to certify the correctness of a proposed analysis of
sentences containing proper names. The two objections quite con-
clusively deny it this function. Quine never explicitly as~lgns the
argument this function. He says that the proof "shows that the purely
referential occurrences of singular terms other than variables can
be got down to tb,e type ' = a'," and later speaks of "a 'theorem of
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confinability of singular terms to the position '= a'." In our must
generous moods, we still must ask why such a theorem has any relevance
in this context, failing the purpose of certifying the proposed theory
of proper names.
It remains for us to consider the prospects of Quine's proposal as
an analysis of the ordinary functioning of proper names in light of the
criticisms of his argument that I have made. Only one strategy seems to
be available. Since proper names are eliminated by the proposal only
under the full version in which '= Socrates' is logically simple, we
must use such unanalyzed predicates and try to explain what kind of
predicates they are. And since the argument for logical equivalence is
fallacious if '= Socrates' has no structure, we must get along without
the argument. On the latter count we are left in as hopeful a position
anyway as that from which Russell defended his analysis of definite
descriptions. He offered no proof of the logical equivalence of (1) and
(2). It is hardly surprising that no logical deduction can be found to
prove the equivalence of an unanalyzed locution and a proposed analysis.
To apply the apparatus of deductive logic to any sentence we must know
beforehand what logical form the sentence has. Discovering that is
precisely the task of analysis. The results of analysis can hardly be
expected to guarantee the correctness of the analysis. Furthermore, we
have argued that more is required for analysis than logical equivalence.
More comprehensive arguments are needed to make Quine's theory a
15 Quine, Word and Object, pp. 178 and 179.
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convincing analysis.
How did Russell argue for the theory of descriptions? He offered
various typically philosophical considerations. He did not base his
theory on narrow linguistic or logical grounds; he employed it instead
in a wide-ranging philosophical theory that had both epistemological
and metaphysical aspects. It is true that the theory of descriptions,has
many specific logical advantages as well. Russell applied it very
successfully to the problem of denials of existence involving definite
descriptions. And it preserves the law of excluded middle for cases
where nothing satisfies the definite description. The theory clearly
handles the analogue of Frege's problem about the Morning Star and the
Evening Star, where descriptions rather than names flank the identity
sign. As a technical device the theory found application in Russell's
logicist reduction of mathematics in Principia Mathematica. Though
Russell evidently had hopes for the theory as part of an explanation of
propositional attitudes and other cases of oblique reference·--this is
the kind of case that occupies most of the text of "On Denoting"--it is
doubtful that an understanding of definite descriptions helps much here.
So goes the scorecard on logical puzzles for Russell's theory. It is an
impressive performance that has secured a permanent place in logical
theory for Russell's analysis. But equally dear to Russell's heart, it
accorded with and reinforced his emerging philosophy of logical atomism.
It protected the atomist doctrine of propositional functions and propo-
sitions from apparent counterexamples. It made unnecessary a notion of
being that, as Russell had come to believe, generated logical absurdi-
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ties. It provided an explanation of our knowledge of entitites with
which we have no primary epistemological contact.
Though Quine refuses to interpret his proposal as an analysis of
proper names in ordinary language, a case can be advanced for it
resembling that of Russell's in form. We have already seen several
logical advantages, those that recommend it as a regiffientation. A
review of the puzzles about reference yields a score very close to that
of the theory of descriptions. Quine's theory results in parallel
solutions in every case, when proper names are substituted for
descriptions. Even Frege's problem seems to be handled by the theorYt
though this case particularly awaits explanation, from the point of view
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of epistemology, of predicates like 'socratizes'. More importantly,
Quine's proposal too fits into a wide ranging philosophical theory.
Quine clearly advocates a doctrine of the primacy of predication that
accords with his epistemological and metaphysical views. His account of
language learning and the development in each speaker of the apparatus
of reference places predication and the learning of predicates in center
stage. And he hopes for a theory of language commdtted only to the
existence of predicates and other inscriptional entities. The unity of
these views naturally depends on a predicative theory of names.
16 Tyler Burge has offered arguments from the point of view of
linguistics in support of Quine's proposal as a theory of ordinary
proper names. See his "Reference and PropeL Names," The Journal of
Philosophy, 70 (1973), 425-439; rpt. in The Logic of Grammar, ed.
Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975),
pp. 200-209.
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It is appropriate to undertake an investigation of this wider
rationale for Quine's elimination of proper names. I will begin an
investigation by contrasting this view with the most influential current
alternative, the doctrine of Kripke and others that employs the notion
of rigid designation and sharply distinguishes names, and perhaps
natural kind terms, from other expressions. The distinction is usually
drawn by attributing sense to the expressions in most linguistic
categories but excepting the category of names. Quine would not be
friendly to a dissent that insisted that names too have sense, but there
are other ways than that to dissolve the distinction.
II. PREDICATES AND RIGID DESIGNATION
If we are tempted by a predicative theory of proper names, the
question naturally arises whether proper names are rigid designators
nonetheless. In "Identity and Necessity", Kripke suggested something
very much like the following as "a simple intuitive test" for whether
17
an arbitrary singular term is a rigid designator. Where a is any
singular term that denotes, consider the proposition expressed by
rex might not have been a.' If this proposition is true, then ex is not
rigid; otherwise a is rigid. (To avoid confusion, we must recognize
17 Saul A. Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," in Indentity and
Individuation, ed. Milton K. Munitz (New York: New York University
Press, 1971), pp. 135-164; see pp. 148-149 in particular.
30
that, in the test sentence, the first occurrence of a must be taken to
have wide scope. Understanding the sentence otherwise would trivially
result in the judgment that no singular term is rigid. If the scope of
the first a is narrow, the test sentence is equivalent to, fpossibly
not (a = a)', which expresses a falsehood so long as a denotes. I take
it that the test sentence is roughly equivalent to the philosopher's
sentence, ra is such that it might have existed and yet not been a.')
This test yields the expected result in the case, for example, of 'the
Roman Catholic President of the United States'. The sentence,
The Roman Catholic President of the United States might not
have been the Roman Catholic President of the United States,
indeed expresses a truth, for Kennedy, i.e., the Roman Catholic Presi-
dent, might never have run for President at all. What is more, Al Smith
might have defeated Hoover in 1928, and if as well Kennedy had never run
for President, then Al Smith, not Kennedy, would have been the Roman
Catholic President of the United States. Therefore, 'the Roman
Catholic President of the United States' is not a rigid designator, just
as Kripke would have expected.
Of course this result does not follow in the case of every definite
description. On Kripke's view, certain other definite descriptions are
shown by this test to be rigid designators. To use Kripke's example,
the sentence,
The positive square root of 25 might not have
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been the positive square root of 25,
expresses a falsehood; it follows that 'the positive square root of 25 ~
is a rigid designator.
A natural extension of this criterion enables us to apply the
notion of rigid designation to general terms and even to arbitrary
monadic predicates. (Here, perhaps, it would better be called, "rigid
denotation".) The transition is eased by considering the general term
produced by dropping the definite article of a definite description.
Though the complex term, 'Roman Catholic President of the United
States', is general, it happens to denote only one thing, that is, to
have an extension with only one element. Since we have already noticed
that this element, Kennedy, might not have been elected President at
all, we know that someone who in fact was a Roman Catholic President
might not have been a Roman Catholic President; in other words, we know
that some Roman Catholic President might not have been a Roman Catholic
President. We will say, therefore, that the term, 'Roman Catholic
President', is not rigid. In contrast, it is false that some positive
square root of 25 might not have been a positive square root of 25,
because, as we have seen already, the only positive square root of 25--
the number 5--must be a positive square root of 25. Accordingly, we
will say that 'positive square root of 25' is a rigid general term.
Nothing prevents us from using a similar criterion for general terms
with wider denotation. Because some President might· not have been
President, 'President' is not a rigid term. And because it is false
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that some square root might not have been a square root, 'square root'
is a rigid general term. Evidently, in the case of any general term a,
if the sentence, rSome a (thing) might not have been (a) a; expresses a
h Q is i id h i Q i rigid. 18 , 19trut ,~ not a r g term; at erw se ~ s Only the
constraints of grammar prevent us from using this test in the case of
any monadic predicate. Again we can use a philosopher's sentence and
adopt the following test for rigidity of any monadic predicate,~. If
the sentence, rSomething such that ~ might not have been such that ~;
expresses a truth, ~ is not rigid; otherwise ~ is a rigid predicate.
Just as the intelligibility of this criterion requires that the
notion of a thing's being 'S essentially makes sense, the notion of a
rigid term has other close connections with essentialist doctrines. It
should be obvious that for any term a that is rigid, the sentence, lIf a
thing is B at all, then it is B essentially,' expresses a truth. In a
manner of speaking, if a is a rigid term, the property which S expresses
is one which is essential to anything that has it at all. This con-
nection is important because the ability successfully to recognize rigid
18 We are committed, in setting out this criterion, to half of what
Quine calls the third grade of modal involvement, for we are committed
therein to the intelligibility of Aristotelian essentialism. We are
not, however, commdtted to the legitimacy of quantified modal lugic or
even of unquantified modal logic, for nothing we do requires the
iteration of statement operators.
19 This criterion needs to be refined. In the case of a rigid
term, we want to rule out the possibility of something which actually
. lies outside the extension of the term, counterfactually lying within
it. A similar refinement is required for the notion of rigid desig-
nation itself.
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designation would comprise a method of settling the question, "Just
which properties are essential?", a method utilizing linguistic con-
siderations. Perhaps it would not judge all cases; the connection with
rigid designation does not constitute a necessary condition for a
prop'erty's being essential, but it does constitute a sufficient con-
dition. And it implies that in the case of a property which satisfies
this sufficient condition, given that it is essential to something, it
is essential to anything that has it at' all'.. In· the interest of theory,
some might conclude that the condition is necessary as well. If so, all
essential properties have this somewhat surprising character. If men
are essentially rational, then anything that is rational is essentially
so.
We have extended the notion of rigid designation to cover general
terms and other predicates. What we now want to examine is the case of
proper names, even supposing that they are predicative. Kripke claims
that proper names are rigid designators. The argument that he offers
several times and with some embellishment really reduces to this simple
intuitive test. Kripke asks us, "Is it true that Socrates might not
have been Socrates?" He claims that the obvious answer is, "No." He
does not really argue for this, but simply claims that any of us who
understand the proposition see right off that it is false.
In the interest of caution, perhaps we had better offer the
strongest challenge we can to these intutitions. What kind of case can
we imagine that will raise the most serious doubts about these
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intuitions?20 I will describe the best one that I have been able to
find after an effort of some years. It will be convenient to fiction-
alize the case somewhat, although I hope everyone can see that the
fiction could have been avoided. Suppose that certain facts about
Socrates are as I will describe. For all I know they are, although I
grant that it is not very likely. Suppose that Socrates had an identi-
cal twin who did not live very long, who in fact lived only a few
minutes or hours after conception. After the crucial division of the
original zygote that resulted in the coming to be of both Socrates and
his twin, the developing organism, Socrates, successfully implanted
himself into the uterine wall, matured into a healthy live fetus, and
eventually was born. On the other hand, the twin failed to implant him-
self and died within a few hours for want of sustenance. As it happened
neither Socrates nor his mother nor anyone else even knew that Socrates
had an identical twin because the twin died so shortly after conception.
In order to understand the case I am drawing, it is crucial to remember
that I am supposing these to have been the actual historical events.
Though it is unlikely that these events did occur in the case of
Socrates' conception, nothing that we know about Socrates rules it out.
It is very likely that such events have occurred in the conceptions of
20 There is an engaging case about a ship, derived from Hobbes, in
Hugh S. Chandler, "Rigid Designation," The Journal of Philosophy, 72
(1975), pp. 363-369. Chandler's case poses a problem precisely because
we are unsure about the identity of the ships. Identity is taken for
granted in my case.
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some human children, though of course no one will ever know which ones.
Why does this case pose a challenge to the intuition that it is false
that Socrates· might not. have been Socrates? The reason is simply that
Socrates' dead twin brother might have been Socrates, while Socrates
himself might have died in utero. What I am imagining--the counter-
factual situation that might have come about, given that the factual
situation was as I have described it--is that the individual that was
Socrates, rather than successfully implanting, might have died within
minutes of conception. And the twin might have implanted himself,
matured into a healthy fetus, been born in approximately 470 B.C., grown
up in Athens, conducted philosophical discussions in the Agora, found an
exceptionally bright student in Plato, been convicted of corrupting the
youth of Athens and sentenced to drink hemlock, been described in the
Platonic dialogues, and so on. In short the twin might have done every-
thing that Socrates in fact did. I am supposing this counterfactual
situation to be entirely indiscernible by human eyes from the actual
historical situation.
Fair enough, you say. Things might have been just as I described
them, but why do I suppose that the case would correctly be described as
I originally described it, that is, as Socrates himself not being
Socrates but his in fact dead twin being Socrates? My shortest reply
would be, I suppose, that that seems to me a correct way to describe
this counterfactual situation. It is tempting to respond to intuitions
with further intuitions. Intuitively, this seems to me to be a case in
which not the actual Socrates, but another person entirely, would be
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Socrates. But I can say more than that about the case.
The first things I want to say are intended to lay to rest ··certain
misapprehensions you may have about what I am claiming. First, I am not
claiming that the actual Socrates is identical in the counterfactual
situation to his twin brother, who would have been Socrates. That is,
to adopt the lately fashionable jargon, I am not claiming that the man
who is Socrates in the actual world is identical to the man who would be
Socrates--the actual Socrates' twin brother--in the possible world I
have described. On the contrary, the actual Socrates is identical to
the individual in the counterfactual situation who died within minutes
after conception. And Socrates' twin is identical to the individual in
the counterfactual situation who lived to be born and went on to teach
Plato.
Second, I am not proposing some particular solution to a problem
about transworld identity. I do not believe that there is a problem
about transworld identity, and I agree with Kripke that descriptions
of counterfactual situations take it for granted that there is no
problem about the identity of an individual who is supposed, contrary
to fact, to fit some description that he really does not fit. My very
description of the imagined situation depended on this. I said,
"Suppose that the individual who was Socrates had died young and the
individual who in fact died young had lived and eventually drunk the
'hemlock. "
Third, I am not denying that U~. rates must be identical with him-
self. I claimed that Socrates might not have been Socrates and advanced
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a scenario to illustrate that ~laim. I did not claim and would deny
that Socrates might not have been who he is. I have no idea what kind
of scenario anyone might advance to convince us thtlt such a th:f.ng is
possible.
Fourth, and perhaps most obviously, I am not supposing that the
sentence, 'possibly not (Socrates = Socrates)', expresses a truth. Just
as I can reasonably suppose that the teacher of Plato might not have
b~en the teacher of Plato without supposing that the sentence, 'possibly
not (the teacher of Plato = the teacher of Plato)', expresses a truth, I
can make the analogous supposition when the definite description is
supplanted by a name. The scope distinctions 'that are commonly made for
definite descriptions to resolve an apparent paradox can be carried over
to the case involving names. Of course, this claim commits me to a
proposition that Kripke denies, namely, that distinctions of scope apply
to proper names as well as to descriptions.
It remains for me to explain why I think that my case is correctly
described AS one j.n which someone other than the actl.\al Socrates would
have been Socrates. It is worthwhile to notice that in this case the
twin would have been named "Socrates". Everyone wOl.11d have called him
"Socrates," and the same people (with one exceptioIl!) as actually
uttereci and believed Stich sentences as the ~~llowing would have uttered
and believed them:
(1) Socrates is down in the market place wasting his time
talking about virtue again.
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(2) Did you hear that Socrates finally got what was coming
to him?
(3) Socrates claimed that knowledge is virtue.
(4) What we know about Socrates largely depends on Plato's
portrayal of him~
Of course I am not making the mistake of supposing that just this much
settles the issue. As is often emphasized, Socrates might not have been
named "Socrates" at all, even supposing that he actually was. And his
best friend might have been named "Socrates". It is not necessary with
regard to every counterfactual situation that we conclude that the
person supposed to have the name "Socrates" be supposed to be Socrates.
To guard against this mistake it is sometimes asked whether, granting
that people might have called the twin "Socrates", they would be using
the word in the same way that we actually do. Would they be speaking
the same language that we actually speak? I believe that this way of
looking at the issue makes the answer I give nearly irresistible. I
have supposed that things in my counterfactual situation were, with very
slight exceptions, exactly as things actually have been. Everyone
believes the same things. Everyone says the same things. Nothing
distinguishes the two situations that could be known by anyone, The
only difference between them is a slight variation in a microsocopic
event occurring within the womb of Socrates' mother. Actually one of
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two very small organisms died while the other flourished; counterfactu-
ally, it was the first mentioned that flourished, while the other died.
Supposing that this difference would make the language we speak a
different language defies belief.
But, you might say, there is one crucial difference between the two
languages; the person designated by the name 'Socrates' is different.
Therefore, the name 'Socrates' is used differently in an absolutely
crucial respect. Before accepting this objection, we will do well to
ask why this respect is supposed to be crucial for names. No parallel
claim would be made for general terms. Suppose that Socrates had never
married and hence that the term 'husband' dio not denote him; there will
be no temptation to conclude that speakers in that case would be using
the term differently, that they would be speaking a different language,
even that one small corner of their language would be different. Some-
one might resist this analogy with the explanation that names, unlike
the term 'husband', are rigid designators. In this context that expla-
nation would beg the question at issue. Another explanation might be
this. Only two characteristics of a singular term are relevant to its
semantics--its reference and its sense. In the case at hand we have
agreed that the reference of 'Socrates' in the language of the CQunter-
factual situation is different from the reference of 'Socrates' in our
actual language. If I insist nonetheless that the semantics of 'Socra-
tes' are the same for the speakers in my counterfactual situation as for
us, then I must attribute that sameness to a sameness of sense. I must
disagree with Kripke and agree with ph11o~ophers like Dummett that
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proper names have sense.
III. REFERENCE WITHOUT SENSE
Before I discuss the issue of whether proper names have sense, let
me raise it again from a different direction. I am ready now to retreat
a bit. Actually I do not believe that if Socrates' twin had not died
but had lived and done everything that Socrates in fact did, then he
would be Socrates. I have no idea who in that case would be Socrates.
And I have been trying to shake your confidence that you know who would
be. I believe that there is no answering that question. There is
nothing about the semantics of the name 'Socrates' in our language that
settles in every bizarre imaginable situation who the name applies to.
And, this being the case, Kripke's simple intuitive test fails to tell
us whether 'Socrates' is a rigid designator or not. Our intuitions are
not up to the task. I surmise that Kripke would respond that there
must be an answer to the question, because if there were none, there
would be no answer to another question that he asks in several places in
Naming and Necessity, namely, "How is the reference of 'Socrates'
21determined?" I surmise that Kripke believes that whatever mechanism
determines what the reference of 'Socrates' actually is, also determines
21 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 27-28, p. 29, n. 5, p. 32,
and p. 106, among many others.
41
wh~t the reference of 'Socrates' would be in every possible counter-
factual situation.
I suspect that tIle question, "How is the reference of 'Socrates'
determined?", gets its force from its similarity to the question, "How
is the reference of 'the teacher of Plato' determined?" In the latter
case the point of the question can be seen in the answer given. An
account can be given, presumably, of how the various constituents--
'the', 'teacher', 'of Plato'--each contribute to the description's
picking out just the individual that it picks out. One way to remind
ourselves that the reference of the description is a function of all
these constituents together is to notice how the reference changes when
we replace one or enother of the constituents with a parallel
expression. Whereas the description as it stands refers to Socrates,
if we replace the word 'Plato' with the word 'Aristotle' (yielding 'the
teacher of Aristotle'), the reference changes to Plato. If we replace
the word 'teacher' with the word 'student' (yielding 'the student of
Plato'), the reference changes to Aristotle. And so on. Perhaps we
think that we can explain why it is that each of these descriptions has
one rather than another thing as its reference. To say these things is
simply to rehearse the Fregean doctrines that the sense of a composite
expression is a function of the senses of its constituents, and that the
reference of any expression is a function of its sense. From these
propositions it immediately follows by composition of functions that
the reference of a description is a function of the senses of its
constituents.
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The classical view of proper names--the Frege-Russel1 view--was one
which tried to project some of the successes of this theory onto the
case of proper names. Since the theory does its work in cases where
compositionality obtains, it was tempting to suppose that proper names
do have a hidden composition that is revealed by supplying the
description which each is supposed to abbreviate. The supposition
accorded well in Russell's case with an emerging theory of knowledge by
description; the theory extracted Russell from a skeptical quandary over
how he could know about any entity that did not bop his consciousness
on its head. The initial implausibility of this theory of proper names
was mitigated slightly by the Searle and Strawson versions, which
loosened the connection of a proper name with this or that particular
property. Then the compositional theory had to be much more elegant,
and so much the better.
Once we abandon this attempt to put compositionality to work for
the case of proper names, we no longer have this kind of answer to give
sense to the question, "How is the reference of 'Socrates' determined?"
Quines's proposal is that names are like descriptions in that they are
fundamentally predicative. Kripke says that on this view the original
question yields to the question, "How is the extension of 'Socratizes'
?2determined?"- That is not a question that is cODmlonly asked with
regard to predicates generally. For some predicates, again those that
are composite, it may be an account of their structure that is wanted.
22 Kripke, Naming and Neces~ity, p. 29, n. 5.
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The predicate, 'Roman Catholic President of the United States', has in
its extension only Kennedy, and this fact can be inferred in part from
information about the linguistic material out of which the predicate is
built. But for syntactically simple terms--'blue', 'mountain', 'walks'--
I~. do not know what kind of answer is wanted. According to the proposal
before us, it is just this kind of predicate that corresponds to each
proper name. 'Socratizes' and 'pegasizes' are syntactically simple and,
for all I know, are semantically simple as well.
Of course some philosophers have claimed that many syntactically
simple terms have semantic structure. This view appears in the semantic
theory of Katz. Indeed it might seem plausible that 'brother' is seman-
tically composed by conjunction out of 'male' and 'sibling'. But it
seems as plausible that 'sibling' is semantically composed by dis-
junction out of 'brother' and 'sister'. What is simple depends on what
primitives we begin with, and no generally accepted theory has selected
a particular set of primitives.
In any case we are bound on anyone's theory to arrive at a set of
simple terms, and it is not clear what is wanted in answer to the
question, "How is its extension determined?", asked about one of these.
Some readings of the question elicit responses of a different kind that
seems expected, responses that leave semantics behind. "How do we know
what the extension of such and such a term is?" Perhaps we do not. And
even when we do, our ways of knowing are multifarious and ill-sorted.
"Is there a function from term to extension?" Of course. It takes
'blue' to blue things, 'mountain' to mountains, 'walks' to things that
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are walking. I have roughly described the function in extension. If
you want a definition of the function or a procedure for computing it,
neither I nor anyone else can give you one.
But aren't I ignoring a classical answer to Kripke's question?
The question, "How is the extension of 'mountain' determined?", may
seem unproblematic because, according to the Fregean tradition, its
extension is determined by its sense. Because Dummett adheres to this
tradition wholeheartedly, he argues that even proper names have sense.
And because Kripke notices that learning someone's name seems nothing
like learning the meaning of a new word, he thinks that there is d
special problem about how names get their reference. We need to ask of
each why this invocation of sense is supposed to be illuminating. If
there is a general problem about what determines the reference of a
term, there is as pressing a problem about what determines the reference
of the sense of a term.
The problem ·most· ... apparently arises for what I call trans-
lational theories of sense. In these the sense of each expression in a
natural language is an expression in some neutral language that is
imagined to underlie the variety of natural languages--semantic
markerese, or a language of thought. The sense of an ordinary term
turns out to be another term, in a hidden language. What then
determines the reference of these hidden terms?
In contrast there is another kind of theory of sense for which tris
problem is solved too easily. These are the possible worlds theories._
In Russell's phrase, they get by theft what the others cannot get by
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honest toil. For them the sense of a term is a function from possible
worlds to extensions. Plug in the actual world, or any other world you
care about, and out pops the extension. About these we could ask not
what determines the reference of the sense of the term, but what
determi.:~2s the sense of the term in the first place? Why is this
particular function rather than another associated with the term at
hand?
It is time to recall that we began this inquiry with an account of
proper names suggested by Quine. He would deny, I suppose, that his
simple predicates have sense. After all, he has repudiated the realm
of meanings. Insofar as senses are supposed to be abstract entities
such that each term of a language has its own particular sense, in
virtue of which the term has the extension it has, Quine would deny that
there are such things as senses. His view would be uniform with regard
both to proper names and their associated predicates and to garden
·variety general terms. If Kripke's questions about how terms get their
reference simply play advance man to this kind of answer, Quine would
repudiate the questions. If instead what is wanted is an explanation of
how speakers come to use language at all, how they associate particular
terms with features of their environment, Quine has set forth the
rudiments of an account in The Roots of Reference and more recent
papers. This account is fundamentally psychological. Whether or not
Quine's particular psychological account is correct, if any psycho-
logical account turns out to satisfy the kind of questions that Kripke
constantly raises in Naming and Necessity, it will undoubtedly fail to
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tell us, in every imaginable counterfactual situation, whether this or
that, is or is not, denoted by a term. Accordingly it will provide no
foundation for the notion of rigid designation. That is the moral of
my story about Socrates and his twin. And I suggest that these
considerations, perhaps among others, motivate Quine's skepticism about
essential properties.
TWO:
FIELD'S THEORY OF TRUTH
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Itl a widely admired recent paper entitled, "Tarski' s Theory of
Truth," Hartry Field sets out two versions of a definition of truth
of the sort first proposed by Alfred Tarski in the early nineteen-
thirties. 1 In it Field provides one version as an account of Tarski's
actual definition. On the other hand he recommends his own version as
the definition (or characterization, as he prefers to call it) Tarski
should have given in order to make transparent exactly what philosophi-
cal work Tarski's theory does. He claims that his version is less
"misleading" and less subject to a particular "misinterpretation"
(p. 348). The feature of the usual philosophical elaboration of Tar-
ski's definition that he regards as a misinterpretation is the claim
that the given definition should be acceptable to someone suspicious
of semantics because it defines truth entirely in other than semantic
terms. It is Field's opinion ·that the Tarski theory, properly under-
stood, reduced the notion of truth to other semantic notions. If
Field's opinion proved well-founded, it would certainly be an important
1 Hartrv Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth," The Journal of Philo-
sophy, 69 (1972), 347-375. All further references to tlliq work aJ:.,pear
in the text. Tarski's original article is Alfred Tarski, "The Concept
of Truth in Formalized Languages," in his Logic, Semantics, Metamathe-
matics~ trans. J. H. Woodger (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956),
pp. 152-278; partial rpt. in The Logic of Grammar, ed. Donald Davidson
and Gilbert Harman (Encino, Cal.: Dickenson, 1975), pp. 25-49.
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realization because Tarski himself doubtless thought it a primary vir-
tue of his theory that it defined truth without using other semantic
notions. In virtually everyone of his many paperD on the subject,
Tarski cit~d this feature of his theory; he perhaps thought it the
feature mos~ responsible for the theory's philosophical significance.
I will argue that Field is mistaken in his interpretation of Tarski,
that Tarski had good reason to Jvoid the version that Field prefers,
that Field's version cannot have the kind of generality that he wishes
for it, and that Field's hopes for completing the version he recommends
by going on to give acceptable definitions of the more basic semantic
terms are unfounded.
I. TWO VERSIONS OF TARSKI'S DEFINITION
Field c1il1s his own version of the truth definition, "Ti", and
the version which he attributes to Tarski, "T2". Because we will have
to attend to certain details of the definitions, there is no avoiding
setting thenl out as Field did. I do this in a tabular format in order
to make eviden~ where the versions agree and where they differ. The
clauses left bl~nk in T2 go over from TI without change (pp. 350
and 354).
(A) 1. 'x 'k
T1
denotes
s
sk· (A) 1.
T2
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2. 'c 'k denotes what j.t denotes.s 'c 'k
3. t"fk(e)' denotes
s
an object a iff
(i) there is an object b that
e denotes , and
s
(B) 1. t"Pk (e)' is trues iff
(i) there is an object a that
e denotes , and
s
2. r-e'is true iff e is not true.
s s
are true •
s
3.
(B) 1.
2.
3.
(i)
(i)
(ii) Pk(a).
4. is true iff for each
s
4.
(C)
sequence s* that differs from s
at the kth place at most, e is
A sentence is true iff it is true
s
for some (or all) s.
(C)
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Readers familiar with the notation and theory of predicate logic
will not find these definitions as opaque as will others. A few remarks
about the definitions will suffice not to supply those others with the
necessary background, but to enable one to decide which class he falls
in. The definitions are not general. They define truth for a particu-
lar language. They divide the sentences of that language into two
sorts, those that are true and those that are false. The language under
cunsideration has variables, indivirlual constants, function symbols, and
monadic predicates. The expressions of each of these kinds are ordered
by a correspondence with the positive integers; the numerical subscript
c0mprising a part of each such expression reveals, in each case, what
the corresponding integer is. The language includes certain other
symbols--'-', '&', and 'V'-- usually called logical constants, and the
symbols '(' and ')1~ whi~a are used to indicate grouping and scope. The
language includes no expressions except those that can be built out of
the fundamental expressions just surveyed by repeated applications of
familiar syntactical operations. The truth definitions, in the more or
less perspicuous form in which they are set out, are inductive defi-
nitions that mirror the possible syntactical operations so as to yield
a truth value for every grammatical sentence of the language. However,
the application of a standard device of set theory would convert them
to another (even) less perspicuous form, in which they would have the
v1.rtue of constituting normal (Tarski's ~erm), or explicit (Field's
term), or proper (Putnam's term) definitions. The idea here is that a
proper definition of a (monadic) predicate is of the form depicted by
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the schema '(Vx)(~ x ++ ~ x)'. In that schema '$ x' is to be replaced
by the predicate being defined. And'~ x' is to be replaced by an open
sentence of some language in which the definition is being given; the
open sentence must have only one free variable, nemely 'x'. Inductive
definitions, as is apparent in the present case, do not have this form.
The definitions employ a metalinguistic variable's' which ranges
over sequences, the items of which (sl' 8 2 , etc.) are whatever objects
the language under consideration talks about. These sequences must be
at least as long as the number of variables in the language (Tarski
actually calls for infinite sequences), but that imposes no restriction
on the number of objects over which the sequences range, for nothing
prevents an objp:t's occurring more than once in one sequence, nor
again, requires that each sequence exhaust all of the objects there
are.
The only terms of the defi~itions remaining to be remarked upon
are those which are peculiar respectively to TI and T2. I have under-
lined three terms in TI--'denotes', 'is fulfilled by', and 'applies to';
they comprise the more basic semantic notions in terms of which TI
defines truth. Of course these terms do not appear in T2 since it pur-
ports to define truth entirely in other than semantic terms. T2 does
include expressions consisting of words of the language for which truth
is being defined overscored by a horizontal bar. A full discussion of
these expressions would be rather lengthy. It is enough for our
purposes to say that they are "abbreviations for the English expressions
that are translations of the corresponding words of the language under
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consideration" (p. 354).
A casual reader of T2 might wonder whether it accurately represents
Tarski's definition of truth. It is well known that Tarski's insight
consisted largely in defining truth by way of defining satisfaction, yet
T2 does not mention satisfaction at all. Tarski recognized that senten-
tial connectives and quantifiers operate not only on sentences but on
expressions with free variables as well .. Only when he developed the
notion of satisfaction could he account for the contribution of these
open constituents of a sentence to its truth value. However, as Field
mentions in an aside, the notion of true , which Tl and T2 in their
s
different ways define inductively, captures Tarski's notion of
satisfaction. Satisfaction is a relation which a sequence does or does
not bear to a possibly open sentence. . sentence, whether open or
closed, is true just in case the sequence s satisfies the sentence in
s
Tarski's sense. In both Tl and T2 truth is simply the limiting case
of satisfaction for an expression with no free variables, that is, for
a (closed) sentence. As it happens, if any sequence satisfies a
sentence, all sequences do. This results from the peculiartttes of
clause (B)4--the same in Tl and T2--which specifies the effect of
placing a variable-bindi~g universal quantifier before an expression
open in that variable., According to that clause, satisfaction of an
expression by a sequence survives the binding of one of its free vari-
abIes only if the expression is satisfied not only by the given
sequence, but by any sequence produced by varying the relevant member of
the given sequence over any object in the domain. Thus when all
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variables in an expression have been bound by quantifiers, yielding a
sentence, it no longer matters what sequence was under consideration
initially. That sequence satisfies the closed expression, that is, the
sentence, just in case any other sequence does. Tarski's account of
satisfaction is more explicit in certain respects than Field's
schematic T2. Crucial issues will turn on just how satisfaction is
defined for atomic formulae, so Tarski's account merits careful
attention. But our current project demands that we provide ourselves
with a broader view of Field's various claims.
We begin a comparison of Tlwith T2 by noting what they have in
common. As we said earlier, both TI (as it stands) and T2 define truth
only for a particular language. Neither provides an account of truth-
in-a-language that ranges over all languages, or even more than one
language. Field acknowledgeA this. He also ackno\Jledges that the
language for which truth is Jefined has a particular property which is
not shared by most languages. To use Tarski's words, as quoted by
Field, in this language "the sense of every expression is unambiguously
2determined by its form" (p. 348). This unfortunate locution is
intended to exclude two quite common linguistic phenomena. Excluded
are words which are ambiguous properly speaking. There are no
expressions in the language which, as we would ordinarily say, have more
than one meaning. An example Field uses is the common noun 'bank',
which means on one hand a certain kind of financial institution and 011
2 Tarski, "The Concept of Truth," p. 166
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another, a sloping marsin of land along a river. (There are several
other hands as well.) Also excluded--this is the second and separate
phenomenon--are expressions which are used more or less systematically
to refer to different entities on different occasions of use. Here
Field's examples are the pronoun 'I' and the given name 'John'. In
these and in other typical cases, it is inaccurate to use the term
'ambiguous' because no variation in meaning is involved. In fact, as
ordinarily uaderstood, it is a feature of the meaning of '1 9 that it
can be used by each different speaker to refer to a different entity,
namely the speaker herself. Nevertheless, each example does contribute
to the possibility that on different occasions of utterance of a single
sentence containing it, different statements, perhaps with different
truth values, are thereby merle. Presumably Field wants to exclude as
well words like 'now' and 'there' and 'tomorrow' and 'immediately' for
which it is at least doubtful whether the notion of r~ference is
appropriate, but which similarly contribute to the dependence of the
statement made by a containing sentence on time, place, speaker,
audience, and other circumstances of utterance or inscription.
Because we will need to return to these matters, it will be helpful
to have some terminology. Following another author, I will call
complete, sentences of the sort included in the language for which truth
3is defined by Tl and T2. Those sentences excluded by the consider-
3 Richard Cartwright, "Propositions," in Analytical Philosophy, ed.
R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 81-103; see p. 97.
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ations of the previous paragraph I will call incomplete. Roughly
my criterion is this. A sentence is complete just in case only one
statement can be made by assertively uttering the sentence. If it is
correct, as I believe it is, that the primary bearers of truth and
falsity are statements, it comes as no surprise that truth with respect
to sentences can be defined only for complete sentences. In these
cases we can take the truth value of a sentence to be that of the single
statement that can be made by uttering the sentence assertively. Since
many different statements with different truth values could be made by
uttering an incomplete sentence, any choice of one or another of these
statements to transfer its truth value to the sentence would be
arbitrary.
Though T1 and T2 have in common the features just discussed,
they do differ in important respects. Field believes that the differ-
ences are such as to give TI three advantages over T2. (1) Although TI
as it stands defines truth only for a language all of whose sentences
are complete, Field claims that it can be extended without difficulty to
cover incomplete sentences as well. He even outlines the extension; in
it truth is defined not for sentences, but for tokens of sentences. In
contrast, he says, T2 cannot plausibly be extended to cover incomplete
4 It is perhaps unfortunate that Field uses these terms to
distinguish different kinds of sentence token (p. 351). Since his
distinction is not invoked herein, no confusion should result. We do
need terms to mark our distinction. Complete sentences are roughly what
Quine calls eternal sentences, but the con.notations of that term are
inappropriately narrow.
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sentences. (2) Although Tl and T2 as they stand both apply only to
a language whoae vocabulary is fixed, Field claims that Tl can be
reformulated beforehand to apply to the language as it acquires
indefinitely many new items of vocabulary. Again he outlines the
reformulation, and again he denies that a comparable reformulation of
T2 is possible. (3) The third advantage is best stated as a dis-
junction. Tl clearly and unashamedly defines truth in terms of more
basic semantic notions. Field seems to claim that either T2 does so
as well but pretends otherwise, giving Tl the advantage of perspicuity,
or else T2 does define truth entirely via nonsemantic notions, as
advertised, but does so in a scientifically unacceptable way.
Eventually we will consider each of these claims individually.
First we will do well to set out an important fact about Tl and T2
which anyone might suspect, but which Field does not acknowledge until
very late in his paper. The fact is that, given suitable bridge
definitions, Tl and T2 are virtually equivalent, though not quite
logically equivalent. If we call these bridge definitions B (we shall
see presently exactly what they are), we can state the logical situation
as follows. rB & TI' is logically equivalent to r B & T2'. Though Tl
and T2 are not strictly logically equivalent, if we accept B we must
believe that Tl and T2 are alike in truth value. And i.f B is logically
true, then TI and T2 are logically equivalent. Since B turns out to be
pretty trivial, one might wonder what all the fuss between Tl and T2 is
about. It is worthwhile to keep this question in mind during the
discussion to come.
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Indeed, when the logical relations between TI and T2 are put this
way, a good deal of Field's rhet0ric about them is seen to be quite
hollow. Field says in a number of places that T2 minus TI is the
trivial B (pp. 363, 364, and 370). He offers several analogies to
explain this remark but ultimately bases it on the correct observation
that the conjunction of T2 with B implies TI. Thus, he claims, TI is
a weaker version of Tarski's theory. But the situation is quite sym-
metrical, for the conjunction of Tl with B implies T2. Logical
arithmetic is less like real arithmetic than Field would have us
notice. The point of these remarks of Field's is to convince us that
whatever interest there is in T2 there is also in TI. He needs this
conclusion to refute the presumption that T2 must be more interesting
and powerful than TI since it does not appeal to undefined semantic
terms. The presumption is false, Field argues, because what we have
to add to Ti to make it imply T2, namely B, is devoid of interest.
Setting the question of interest aside, we should remember that if B is
true, even though it is trivial, then rTl ~ T2' is true also, and thus
T2 correctly defines truth if TI does. They capture the same property.
And the more like a truth of logic B turns out to be, the closer TI
comes to actually implying T2, so that the identity of the extension
of 'true' in TI and T2 is no accident~ In order to deny the truth of B,
Field will have to give up his argument that TI is merely a more
cautious theory than T2 and one our scientific scruples should prefer.
As we will see, Field really advocates a modified form of Tl which
embodies very strong semantic assumptions and which does not follow from
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Tarski's theory at all.
Whether Field believes that B is true or that B is false, then,
turns out to be a crucial question for evaluating Field's claims. So
similar are Tl and T2 that the clever reader will already have guess~d
what B is, even if she has read neither Tarski nor Field. Since only
three clauses of the alternative definitions differ, and these are the
ones in which Tl employs its three semantic terms, all that is needed
to make Tl and T2 eq~Jivalent to one another is to provide appropriate
definitions of the three semantic terms. And since the number of
simple individual constants, function symbols, and monadic predicates
is in each case finite, we can provide such definitions. In the case
of 'denotes', the following definition carries (A)2 of Tl over into
the corresponding clause of T2.
(D) (Ve) (Va) (e is an individual constant that denotes a ~
«e = 'e , & a = c1) v (e = 'e ' & a = ~ ) v v1 2 2 . .
(e = 'e , & a = C »)5
n n
I will not bother to give them, but analogous definitions (F), of 'is
fulf illed by', and (A), of 'applies to', ca.rry clauses (A) 3 (ii) and
(B)l(ii) of Tl over into the corresponding clauses of T2. Then B is
simply the conjunction of these definitions, r D & F & A'. Tarski
actually envisioned such definitions of various semantic relatioils, as
Field himself observes. In hi~ main paper Tarski specifically mentioned
5 Compare Field's (D2) (p. 370); also, his (DE) and (DG) (p. 365).
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definitions of the relation of denotation and of the relation of a
monadic predicate defining a property. His definition of denotation
was slightly different from (D) because it used what for him was the
fundamental notion--satisfaction. But (D) is exactly what Tarski's
concept of denotation comes down to for the case of i&dividual
6
constants. It is because (D), (F), and (A) are specifically fashioned
to transform T1 into T2 and vice versa that I have called them bridge
definitions.
Now, one might ask, aren't bridge definitions unexceptionable?
Can't we stipulate that 'denotes', 'is fulfilled by', and 'applies to',
used in a theoretical setting) are defined any way we like, and thereby
insure the truth of the definitions? How caL Field deny them? It
seems indisputable that we can, and adopting -this line leads us to
conclude that given B, i.e., given that we stipulate that B is true,
Ti and T2 are merely different forms of the same definition. Neither
is weaker nor stronger than the other, anrl only super."icia1 convenience
can make the form of one preferable to the form of the other. Even
Field's argument that "the staniard of extensional equival~nce doesn't
guarantee an acceptable reduction," and thus does not guarantee the
equal acceptability of TI and T2 has no force here (p. 363), On this
6 Tarski, "The Concept of Truth," pp. 193-4 and p. 194! ~1. 1. It
is unclear just what Tarski means by "name" in the footnote, where the
definition of denotation is given, since tpe~e flre no individual
constants in the formalized language he considers, but only free
variables. Unlike (D), the definition he gives would work as well for
definite descriptions or other singular terms as for individual con-
stants.
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line B is very much like a truth of logic; one inevitably recalls
Carnap's meaning postulates. If B is a meaning postulate, then TI and
T2 do not merely have the same truth value, but are logically equi-
valent.
There is a reply available to Field. He must grant that we can
give these as definitions of three technical terms that only serve to
recast T2, the definition we begin with, into a definition that uses
the same words as TI. But then he must insist that this is not what
he means by TI. When he uses these three semantic terms, he does not
adopt them as terms of art to be given what meaning we like; rather
he uses them to mean what they mean independent of any stipulation.
When he says "denotes," so his reply goes, he is talking about deno-
tation, and whether (D) captures the relation of denotation cannot
be settled by stipulation.
When we consider (D) in that light, it becomes perfectly clear,
despite his saying that it is trivially true, that Field does not
believe that (D) is true at all. 7 He must deny (D) in order to extend
TI to secure the first advantage which he claims for it. In the
extension which he sketches, Field attributes truth to certain tokens of
incomplete sentences. He claims that tokens of words like 'I' and
'John' denote whatever the persons producing these tokens refer to by so
7 Field actually says not that (D) is trivially true, just that it
is trivial and "of no interest tl (pp. 363 and 370). But he does not say
that it is false.
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doing. Thus he believes that the relation of denotation includes in its
course of values such pairs as a particular token of 'I' together with
Field himself or a particular token of 'John' together with Jehn Adams.
This is incompatible with (D) because the "only if" half of (D) limits
the course of values of denotation to those pairs actually listed in
(D), and the pairs listed have only word types as first members. No
word tokens occur in the domain of the denotation relation at all
according to (D), yet Field's extension presupposes that at least some
word tokens denote. That is why Field must deny (D) in order to save
the proposed extension. Similarly Field's further reformulation of TI
to secure his second claimed advantage runs afoul of (D). This reformu-
lation enables Ti automatically to handle accretions of new vocabulary
to the language by supposing, among other things, that new individual
constants denote certain objects. Again the reformulation succeeds only
if the denotation includes in its course of values pairs not listed in
(D), and thus again, Field must deny (D) to save the reformulation.
It is interesting to notice the logical situation that obtains when
(D) is weakened to accomodate these reformulations of Ti. When we
change the connective 'if and only if' in (D) to a mere 'if', we get,
(D') (Ve) (Va) «(e = 'c I ' & a = cI) v (e = 'c2' & a = c2) v .• v
(e = 'c ' & a = ~)) ~ e is an individual constant that
n n
denotes a).
(D') does not contradict Field's two proposed extension of Ti. Given only
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rD' & F & A', TI and T2 are no longer equivalent. However, rTl + T2'
does follow from rD, & F & A'. This suggests that Tl is actually the
stronger theory, rather than T2, as Field claims. Intuitively speaking,
T2 treats of a specific, though infinite, stock of sentences and effect-
ively divides them into truths and falsehoods. On the other hand Tl
employs the notion of denotation, along with the other semantic relations,
to attribute truth and falsity to an open-ended supply of sentences.
Though we are supposed to understand the relation of denotation, Field
provides no effective method for determining when the relation obtains.
In committing itself to such a relation, TI constitutes the stronger
theory.
It might be objected that we have misconstrued Field's argument for
the modesty of his claims. Whether Field believes B or not is not at
issue, so the objection goes, because it was Tarski who committed him-
self to something like B in suggesting definitions of the various
semantic relations. What Field says is that Tl is a weaker version of
Tarski's semantic theory, and Tarski's theory is not merely T2, but
rB & T2'. TI does follow logically from that conjunction. As far as I
can see, this point is of no interest whatever. What matters is whether
Field's semantic theory is a weaker version of Tarski's theory. We have
seen that r NB~ , as well as TI, must be part of Field's theory, and
rB & T2' certainly does not imply r-B & TI'.
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II. TRUTH FOR SENTENCE TOKENS
What are we to say about Field's extension of Tl to cover incomplete
sentences? No doubt he is right to say that no plausible extension of T2
will enable it to handle these cases. If his proposal for extending Tl
were plausible, then it would constitute a genuine advantage. I now want
to argue that it is not plausible. Field's account of the extenoion is
not very full; for that reason my objections depend on making certain
assumptions about the details of it. In order to avoid the obvious obsta-
cles to attributing truth and falsity to incomplete sentences (i.e., to
incomplete sentence types), Field changes Ti from a definition of truth
for sentences to a definition of truth for tokens of sentences. Apparently
the change applies to all sentences, not just to incomplete ones; under
the revised TI, truth is a property of tokens of complete sentences as
well as tokens of incomplete sentences. As we have noted, the definition
assumes a relation of denotation between tokens of names and appropriate
objects. Field says, "a name token denotes an object if the person who
spoke or wrote the token referred to the object by so doing" (p. 351).
Given that the revised definition attributes truth not to complete sen-
tences but to their tokens, this latter claim seems to apply not only to
names (so-called) like 'I' and 'John' which occur in incomplete sentences,
but to names in complete sentences as well.
My first objection arises from this assumption. If we take Field at
his word, the denotation of tokens of names turns out to be what recent
literature has called speaker's reference, that object referred to by a
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speaker in using a referring expression. This notion of speaker's refer-
encewas developed to handle certain pathological cases of reference. Due
to some kind of misinformation a speaker occasionally refers to an object
by using a description that does not correctly describe it or a name that
is not a name for it. Donnellan's original example had a speaker at a
cocktail party using the phrase, 'the man drinkins a martini', to refer to
someone who in fact had water in his glass. Kripke suggested that a simi-
lar phenomenon could occur with people's names. Smith is seen at a dis-
tance and taken to be Jones. In asking, "What is Jones doing?lI, the
speaker refers to Smith. If these cases are correctly described in this
way, there seems to be no reason why a similar case could not occur with
an individual constant. I suppose that the least doubtful cases of indi-
vidual constants in English are symbols like '1' and 'n', which name
mathematical entities, but it would be awkward, though possible, to
contrive an example using such a term. Since the characteristic of indi-
vidual constants that is crucial for these matters is uniqueness of refer-
ence, let us suppose that 'Santa Claus' is an individual constant. (I
doubt that it is a name that is given to many people.) It suits this con-
text because it is easy to imagine a situation where a speaker who is
misinformed uses the name to refer to someone. Suppose that in the course
of describing his Christmas season visit to the department store, a child
says, "Santa Claus had a soft white beard." Presumably he did refer to
8 Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philo-
sophical Review, 75 (1966), 281-305. Also see remarks in Saul A. Kripke,
Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980),
p. 25 and n. 3; originally in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Donald
Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 253-355.
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someone in using the name 'Santa Claus"; he referred to the man dressed
up as Santa Claus, on whose lap he had sat. According to the revised Tl
designed to handle tokens of incomplete sentences, the token of the
sentence, 'Santa Claus had a soft white beard', that he uttered, was true,
for that man did have a soft white beard. Unfortunately the sentence
itself (the type) is not true~ Since the sentence is complete, theories
like T2 and the original Tl can handle it, and both would assign it
falsity. Other theories would assign it no truth value. But no theory
would assign the sentence itself truth. If the notion of speaker's refer-
ence is coherent at all, it shoulc be obvious that examples can be
developed in which a sentence itself is false on all accounts though the
token is true on Field's theory. So it turns out that Field's extension
of Tl assigns truth values to tokens of incomplete sentences at the
expense of denying complete sentences that definiteness of truth value
that was to be their chief virtue. Of course Field could avoid this
result by leaving Tl intact for complete sentences and supplementing it
for incomplete sentences in the way he suggests. But this would be to
utilize two different relations of denotation in the definition of truth.
Further problems attend an attempt to assign trut~ values to tokens
of sentences so long as truth is made to depend on what the speaker refers
to in using a name token. According to Field's extension the following
sentence token is false because there is no object that the person who
wrote it referred to by using the n~~e 'Santa Claus'.
Santa Claus had a soft white beard.
That result might not trouble us until we realize that the token would
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be false even if there were a Santa Claus. The person who wrote it merely
displayed it as an example; he did not even try to use the name to refer
to anything. Even more troubling is the result that the following token
turns out to be true, not because there is no Santa Claus, but because the
part governed by '-' being part of an example in which no reference was
intended, is not true.
-Santa Claus had a soft white beard.
Field's extension must at least be augmented with a distinction between
tokens used assertively and others. Obviously a theory of truth for
sentence tokens must provide for truth-value gaps since tokens are used
for all kinds of purposes beside asserting truths. Adequate machinery for
making this distinction will so far exceed anything provided in either of
TI and T2 that is unclear that TI has a significant head start.
It might be supposed that all of these objections arise merely from
taking Field too literally about what the speaker refers to in using a
name. Just as the original TI considered only the semantic reference of
names in complete sentences, perhaps the extension of TI should shun the
complexities of speaker's reference and employ the semantic reference of
names in incomplete sentences, taking advantage of the variation of
semantic reference from token to token. Though the sugg~tionsounds
promising, there is reason to doubt that there is any semantic reference
for many of the substantives that typically occur in incomplete sentences.
The sen~ntics of pronouns impose seme constraints on their reference, but
even in context the constraints are not strong enough to fix the refer-
ence. For many occurrences of 'he', 'she', 'it', and even 'y~u', anunder-
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standing of the speaker's subject matter and what the speaker is likely to
want to refer to is required for resolving pronominal reference. And
clearly nothing in the semantics of demonstratives like 'that' or 'those'
will be adequate for determining the reference. For such denoting
expressions speaker's reference is very likely all that there is on which
to build a theory.
Speaking more broadly, Field's proposal for incomplete sentences errs
in trying to attach truth values to sentence tokens at all. I observed
earlier that truth attaches primarily to statements. A semantic theory of
truth is possible for complete sentences only because of a certain
simplicity of fit between those sentences and what statements can be made
with them. The relations between incomplete sentences and the various
statements made with them on various occasions are more complicated. The
day might come when we understand these relations and have both a theory
of truth for statements and an account of what statements are made on the
occasion of uttering what sentence tokens and of what occasions result in
no statement being made at all. Here there is plenty of room for Austin's
observation that utterances can suffer many infelicities besides falsehood.
When that day comes, there will be no obstacle to assigning truth values
to certain sentence tokens parasitic on the truth values of statements
made by uttering them. To do so now would be to mask ignorance with
confusion.
III. GENERALITY IN TRUTH DEFINITIONS
In attributing the second advantage to TI, Field claims for it a
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kind of generality not enjoyed by T2. The form of Tl inevitably ties it
to a language which is static, fixed once for all in the expressions it
includes and the sentences that can be built out of them. It is a
familiar feature of natural languages that they change over time.
Specifically their vocabularies become ever larger as speakers encounter
new things they wish to speak of and conceive new ides3 they wish to
express. Field suggests reformulating Tl to make it a theory of truth
not only for the language under consideration at one moment, with the
vocabulary and expressive power it has at that moment, but a theory that
would continue to distinguish the true sentences from the false as the
language grew in vocabulary. The reformulation achieves this by relieving
the various clauses of TI of their specificity. For exam~le both in the
original Tl and in T2, clause (A)2 goes schematic for a long conjunction,
each conjunct of which mentions a particular individual constant and gives
its denotation for the sequence at hand. In the case of T2, saying what
s
the various constants denote requires different words in each case, so
s
the conjunctive form of the clause cannot be avoided. In order to
formulate a definite conjunction, the theory must settle on a finite stock
of individual constants, one to be mentioned in each conjunct. By
contrast each conjunct in Tl has the same predicate: such and such a
constant denotes what it denotes. This obviously evokes a generalization:
s -------
9
any individual constant denotes what it denotes. The generalization
s
accomodates any individual constant which accrues to the language in the
course of time. Similar generalizations reformulate clauses (A)3 and ~~)l;
9 Compare Field's clause 2 (p. 353).
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in each case specific mention of the various function symbols and
predicates is discarded in favor of generalizations for any function
symbol and for any monadic predicate. Apparently Field envisions a
theory that will even accommodate novel expressions for negation, con-
10junction, and universal quantification (p. 353, n.lO). Since additional
expressions for these logical operations do not enhance the expressive
power of the language, this accommodation is not very important.
Before commenting on the reformulation, I want briefly to explore
the question of generality in truth definitions. No doubt all philoso-
phers would be gratified to have a theory of truth that was completely
general. In principle--that is, in abstraction from the facts--.a general
theory could define truth simpliciter. In doing so it would yield a
principle that no matter what sis, s is true just in case ~(s), where
'~(s)' stands for the result of predicating 'of s, some monadic predicate
that could be as complicated. as the theory would require. A very simple
consideration defeats the hope for such a theory. Nothing prohibits a 8in-
gle sentence from occurring in more than one language, and furthermore,
from being true in one language and false in another. This can happen
even with a complete sentence. The intuitive idea is that the meaning of
the sentence differs in the different languages so as to make it true in
the one and false in the other. Since the notion of truth siropliciter is
consequently doomed, any correct theory must employ the notion of truth-in-
10 Field concludes the note with this remark, "The use of semantic
categories in the generalized truth characterization raises important
problems which I have had to suppress for lack of space in this ·paper."
Perhaps he there anticipates some of the objections that I raise later in
this section.
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a-language that is good for all languages. This kind of theory would
yield a principle that for any language L, no matter what sis, s is true
in L just in case ~(s,L), where this time '~(s,L)' stands for the result
of predicating of the pair, <s,L>, some diadic predicate, again as
complicated as the theory would require. Now Tarski knew very well that
hopes for a general theory even of this form are illusory. Many languages
--in fact all of the important natural languages--have a characteristic,
which he called universality, which stands in the way of consistently
applying the notion of truth to their sentences. In universal languages
sentences can be formulated which speak of their own truth and falsity,
and thus in these languages the Paradox of the Liar can be formulated. 11
Our hopes must settle on an even more modest generality in a theory
of truth. Nothing in Tarski's discussion argues against the possibility
of developing a theory of truth which yields a principle that for all
languages L, if L excludes semantic terms which apply to its own expres-
sions, then no matter what sis, s is true in L just in case ~(s,L).
Nonetheless, though he never explicity argued against this possibility~
the theory of truth that Tarski developed did not have this form. We
have constantly noted that Tarski's theory merely defined truth for a
11 As is now widely understood, mere formulation of the Paradox of
the Liar is not enough to establish a contradiction. Only in a theory
that includes extralogical axioms can any proposition that is not a truth
of logic be established. And only in a theory which has axioms or defi-
nitions which govern the notion of truth and which have a certain minimal
power can the admission of the Liar sentence lead to contradiction. There
are ways to avoid paradox even though the Liar sentence be considered well-
formed, but they involve a considerable complication of the treatment of
truth. See Saul Kripke, "Outline of a Theory of Truth," The Journal of
Philosophy, 72 (1975), 690-716. -----
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particular language. An examination of T2 reveals the extent to which
the definition which it expresses is limited to t~e particular language
under considerat10n. The three clauses peculiar to T2 each employ
expressions--those overscored by the horizontal bar--which are trans-
lations of terma of the language for which truth is being defined.
Nothing is said about how these translations are achieved or about what
standards of correctness govern them. It is simply assumed as a pre-
requisite to the theory that correct translations of the relevant terrns
of the language can be expressed and that in constructing the definition
of truth for the language we have these translations ready at hand. In
itself the assumption is harmless enough because when we set out to define
truth for the particular language we probably do have these translations
at hand; if we did not, we very likely would not be interested in a truth
definition for the language anyway. In the case of the very simple
language for which Tarski actually gave a truth definition in his prin-
cipal paper, the assumption is particularly harmless because that language
is a part of the language we speak. Nevertheless, the important point
with regard to generality in truth definitions is that it cannot be
assumed that translations of all expressions in all languages are available.
No method of gen~rating translations for languages generally is even con-
templated by Tarski. The apparatus which T2 uses serves only for defining
truth-in-that-language for which it does define truth.
On the other hand, Tl does not employ translations of the language
under consideration. In it there are no terms overscored by a horizontal
bar. We saw Field exploit this fact in generalizing TI to accommodate
extensions of vocabulary. With a little tinkering the main part of Tl
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can constitute a diadic predicate to replace '$(8,L)', as required for a
general theory of truth. Among other revisions, the basic semantic
notions and the intermediate inductive notions used in Tl must all be
relativized to L. Thus our old friend clause (A)2 becomes,
(A) 2. Any individual constant in the vocabulary of L denotes
s
in L what it denotes in L.
The question can hardly be suppressed whether Tl thus ultimately revised
might serve as the hoped-for general definition of truth. Field carefully
avoids any consideration of this question though I see nothing else that
could motivate his demand for a scientifically acceptable definition of
primitive denotation. Let there be no uncertainty about my answer to this
question. Tl so revised cannot serve as a general theory of truth.
Some of its deficiencies are quite superficial and can therefore be
ameliorated. I have in mind the limitation to monadic predicates, the
treatment of only two of at least sixteen possible truth functions, and
the treatment of universal quantification to the exclusion of the existen-
tial and other more unusual quantifiers (for example, 'exactly one', 'at
most fifty-nine', etc.). We know enough about the logical relations among
these different devices to expect that a sufficiently general account can
be developed to handle them all. Actually some interesting problems do
arise even at this superficial level. For example since there is no limit
in principle to the number of places which a predicate in some language
might have, no finite number of clauses like (B)l will suffice. Some
general clause must be constructed to handle n-place predicates for any
number n. The clause must incorporate a general description of the
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sentence that results from supplanting the n different openings in an
n-place predicate by the singular terms e l , e 2 , • • • • , and en
respectively. It is common for an account of the semantics of a formal
language to utilize such a description for that particular formal1anguage,
whose syntax is known. But it is unclear how to construct a description
that will handle predicates in many different languages with different
syntactic structures.
TI suffers other deficiencies, these so profound as to make me skep-
tical that a general theory of truth can be hoped for at all. An outline
of them has the present purpose of illuminating Field's more modest claim
to generality for TI, namely, the accommodation of an expanding vocabulary.
My first worry concerns the definiteness of the proposed theory. General-
izing TI to a variable language requires, as we saw, relativizing the basic
semantic notions. The definition of truth now depends on a general notion
of denotation-in-L good for all languages. Obviously the same consider-
ations about generality previously rehearsed for the case of truth apply
here to denotation. Is denotation-in-L to be different for each value of
L, perhaps defined by a list of its course of values for each L1 Of course
this will not do, for the same reason that T2 would not serve as a general
account of truth; it would require having beforehand translations of all of
the names in all languages. What is required is a general account that
says that e denotes a in L just in case ~(e,a,L). Of course this calls to
mind Field's demand for a scientifically acceptable definition of deno-
tation. But our current position is much worse than Field's position with
the original, modest TI. It is not just that we have no reduction of a
fairly well understood relation; we have no idea for variable languages
what the relata of denotation are.
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Think of all the things that philosophers have claimed to be mediated
by the relation of reference. Sentences, with truth values. Singular
terms in oblique contexts, with their customary senses. Parts of paintings,
with objects in the scene being depicted. Truth-functional connectives,
with truth functions. Notes in a musical score with pitches. The physical
states of complexes of neurons, with--I choose the phrase deliberately--
anything you can think of. Our intuitive idea of the relation between
given names and their bearers collapses under this burden.
I have other worries about the adequacy of anything like Tl as a
general account of truth. These arise from doubts about the universality
of predication as a vehicle for expressing truths. We are all familiar
with opaque contexts of singular terms. In these the term seems not to
denote at all, and tuus the surrounding expression does not constitute a
predicate. Some cases that seem to require unacceptable ontological com-
mitments may best be viewed as not involving ordinary predications at all.
'The hole in this doughnut is small' may be true without there being dough-
nut holes, but not so long as it implies that something is small. Since
these worries would carry us far afield, let us set them aside in favor of
observing, now more clearly, Field's second advantage for TI.
If we do not understand denotation for variable languages, do we
understand any better that notinn as it applies to arbitrary extensions of
the vocabulary of our particular language? I am not sure that we do. In
order for Field's own reformulation of TI to have definite content, we must
assure ourselves that we understand the phrase, "what it denotes," for
any individual constant that accrues to the vocabulary to the language.
Field's theory has some protection when extensions of the vocabulary go so
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far as to shake our confidence, for his reformulation of Tl requires
"that the general structure of the language be fixed, e.g., that the
semantic categories (name, one-place predicate, etc.) be held constant"
(p. 353). Perhaps the semantic category comprising individual constants,
what Field calls "names", is characterized by at least a rough criterion
of denotation for its elements. My worries about predication can similarly
be forestalled with a characterization of the category of predicate, though
I fear this will involve a circularity. If fixing the general structure
of the language were to dissolve these worries, I would press no specific
objection to the reformulation and would grant Field the advantage he
claims for Ti. I would only emphasize how modest an advantage it is. Any
extension of the vocabulary of the particular "language which will survive
what has turned out to be a very strong qualification on the scope of the
reformulation is such that we can see right off how to rewrite T2 to
accotmIlodate it.
I have said very little about Field's third advantage for Tl, the one
that has been most widely discussed by others. It should be obvious that I
believe that Tarski was serious in claiming that his theory defined truth
entirely in other than semantic terms. Tarski did not base his theory on
general semantic relations, of which we have an adequate pretheoretic
understanding though no theoretical account, precisely because he did not
think therewere any such relations. That leaves him open to Field's
accusation that Tarski's truth is a scientifically unacceptable notion.
Though I am unsympathetic to the physicalist doctrine with which he
supports this accusation, I do think there is something -to his worries.
In order to carefully assess his accusation we must distinguish senses in
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which a notion can fail to be a scientific one. Tarski's truth is scien-
tifically acceptable in that it is well-defined, or at least as much so as
the terms in the language to which it applies. Precise definition is not
enough, however, to give a term a place in certain kinds of scientific
explanations. Certain explanations might best be called causal expla-
nations; these are particularly prominent among scientific explanations.
My own approach has been to suggest that truth, and reference, are not
casual explanatory notions. If I am correct, there is an important
sense in which they are not scientific notions and cannot be at the heart
of scientific explanations.
THREE:
TRUTH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
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An extended but severely critical scrutiny of another philosopher's
writing usually answers to one of two motivations. Most often the critic
profoundly respects the views being examined and wishes to explain why in
the end he thinks them incorrect, even if tempting. The second motivation
appears more rarely. Here the critic has little or even no respect for
the object of his attention, but believes it necessary for the improvement
of philosophical understanding to expose errors that are both egregious
and generally unrecognized. Examples are painful to recall. Because my
own motivation fits neither of these descriptions, I have hesitated to
cast the remarks below in the form of an extended critical commentary--
in this case, a commentary en Paul Benacerraf's article, "Mathematical
Truth."l My discussion may seem somewhat diffuse, but Benacerraf's essay
itself, proposing as it does a program of investigation for all of the
philosophy of mathematics, is unavoidably diffuse,: and varied in content.
There are conceptual difficulties facing Benacerraf that vitiate the
thesis that he propounds, general and elusive as Benacerraf deliberately
makes that thesis. I have not resisted structuring my own essay around
Benacerraf's because his essay has structured my thinking on this subject
1 Paul Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth," The Journal of Philosophy,
70 (1973), 661-679. All further references to this work appear in the
text. That paper was presented at a symposium on the subject of mathe-
matical truth held at a joint meeting of the Eastern Division of the
American Philosophical Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic,
in December, 1973. The other symposiasts were Saul Kripke and Oswaldo
Chateaubriand. Benacerraf read an earlier (1967) and longer version of the
paper to audiences at several universities. That version circulated in
typescript, and I have benefited from reading it in addition to the
published version.
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during the time since I first read it. If I am excused at all, it is by
the likelihood that I am not unusual in this respect. I surmise--these
things are surprisingly hard to verify--that the article has been widely
read and discussed, and that the dilemma that it poses has begotten more
2than one recent treatise in the philosophy of mathematics. The diffi-
culties that confront Benacerraf have confronted others working in the
philosophy of mathematics and in the philosophy of language. Perhaps our
time will be well spent in clearing some of them up.
In the course of this study, I defend three primary claims regarding
the philosophy of language and its relation to the philosophy of mathe-
maties:
(1) No unified and comprehensive semantic theory for the language
of mathematics is to be expected on the basis of current
achievements.
(2) Nevertheless, a systematic theory of truth for mathematical
statements is available, in the form of a theoretical definition
of truth of the sort first formulated by Alfred Tarski, together
with supporting axioms and rules of inference.
(3) The correctness of this theory of truth is not a genuine issue
in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, the theory
does not entail or otherwise lend support to Platonism.
2 Mark Steiner's Mathematical Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1975) seizes one horn of the dilemma that Benacerraf poses, which
will be described below. And Hartry Field's recent book, Science without
Numbers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), seizes the other.
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My defense of these claims emerges from a discussion of Benacerraf's
analysis of the condition of contemporary philosophy of mathematics.
Benacerraf's analysis emphasizes a conflict which he claims to find
between the requirements of a satisfactory semantics for the language of
mathematics and the requirements of a plausible account of mathematical
knowledge. I describe this conflict in Section I. In setting out his
semantical requirement, Benacerraf unsystematically intersperses five
notions: the notion of a theory of truth, the notion of a theory of
logical fo~ the notion of an account of the semantics of singular terms,
the notion of an explanation of the semantics of the quantifiers, and the
notion of a formulation of the truth conditions of a proposition. Con-
trary to the presupposition of much work in semantics, I believe that
these notions are more or less independent of one another, and that some
of them are perhaps not even philosophically significant. I argue for
this and thereby defend my first claim, that we should expect no compre-
hensive semantic theory, over the course of several sections. In Section
II, I argue that no definitive theory of logical form is in sight, and
that in fact there is no such thing as the lo.gical form of a statement.
In Section III, I maintain that theories of the semantics of singular
terms cannot contribute significantly to the theory of truth. I argue in
Section IV that a theory of truth does not explain the semantics of the
quantifiers and that no other theory does either. An understanding of
quantifiers depends on the general understanding of a language in which
quantifiers occur and a grasp of the principles of reasoning which govern
them. And in Section V, I point out that the call for truth conditions,
unless it is to be answered trivially, presupposes metaphysical or 11n-
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guistic doctrines which are not widely held. In each of the sections I
take care to make clear what notion I am discussing and to distinguish it
from other semantic notions with which it is sometimes confused.
Having distinguished it from other semantic notions, I turn in
Section VI to the theory of truth for mathematics and the defense of my
second claim, that we do have a systematic theory of truth for mathe-
matical statements. I distinguish the notion of a theoretical definition
of truth from the notion of an arbitrary statement of truth conditions.
Then I urge that Tarksi's theory of truth qualifies as a theoretical
definition of truth that elucidates the concept of truth for philosophical
purposes. What's more, the theory has consequences that express what we
ordinarily regard as most central to the notion of truth, namely, that a
sentence is true if and only if the situation that it describes actually
obtains; these consequences attest almost irresistibly to the correctness
of the theory. I believe that these considerations should lay to rest
whatever doubts Benacerraf has about the availability of a philosophically
adequate theory of mathematical truth.
Running through Benacerraf's paper is the suggestion that embracing
a Tarski theory of truth for mathematical language commits us to Platonism
in the philosophy of mathematics. Thus the relevance of my third claim,
that the correctness of Tarski's theory of truth is not a genuine issue in
the philosophy of mathematics. Of course, what I mean is that, if the
theory is properly understood, there should be no resistance to accepting'
it from philosophers with whatever views about the nature of mathematical
objects and the proper forms of mathematical reasoning. The simple reason
is that this theory of truth is neutral with regard to these metaphysical
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issues, just as Tarski intended it to be. The detailed defense of this
third claim occupies Section VII. I formulate several principles that
are central to Platonism. A careful examination of each of them shows
it to be entirely independent of an at most mildly reformed version of
Tarski's definition of truth.
This leads to what is perhaps the most interesting conclusion of this
study, that contrary to widely held opinion and despite our habits of
expression, there is no problem about the nature of mathematical truth.
The ~portant classic positions in the foundations of mathematics were
not positions on the nature of mathematical truth, and even today the
nature of truth is not at the heart of disagreements in the philosophy of
mathematics. There are genuine disagreements, and questions involving
truth enter into some of them, but there is no room for significant
disagreement about what it is that we are saying about mathematical
propositions when we say tllat they are true.
I. BENACERRAF'S DILEMMA
There appears to Benacerraf a fundamental dilemma in the philosophy
of mathematics, a tension between the requirements of the semantics of
mathematics (better, of mathematical language) and those of the episte-
mology of mathematics. True to his title, he takes his dilemma to obstruct
a satisfactory account of mathematical truth. He divides philosophies of
mathematics into two categories, what he variously calls "Platonistic" or
"standard" views and what he calls "combinatorial" views, claiming that
Platonistic (or standard) views are motivated by a concern for a satis-
factory semantics and that combinatorial views are motivated by a concern
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for plausible conclusions in the epistemology of mathematics. The weak-
ness of each kind of view coincides with the strength of the other. Thus
if mathematical statements share their semantics with statements from the
rest of our language (as on the standard view), we cannot account for our
knowledge of them. On the other hand, if our knowledge of mathematical
statements is accounted for in the natural way (as on the combinatorial
view), their semantics must be divergent. Either way we lack an acceptable
comprehensive view of mathematics, which must have both semantic and
epistemological components. Therein lies the dilemma.
Whatever we discover below about the concern for semantics, the gist
of Benacerraf's epistemological claim is that Platonism defends a realm of
mathematical objects of which human beings eould never know. According to
a causal theory of knowledge, knowledge of any object is gained by entering
into causal relations with it. Mathematical objects are presumed to be
abstract and outside the causal nexus; for that reason nothing about them
would be knowable if they did exist. Since we could know nothing about
then, there is, according to this theory, no reason to suppose that they
do exist. In contrast, combinatorial views in the philosophy of inathe-
maties emphasize the role of proofs in yielding our knowledge of mathe-
matical propositions, presumably meriting the blessing of causal theories
of knowledge. However pressing these epistemological concerns are, I
will not comment further on them. Our interest will lie in Benacerraf's
concern for semantics.
Among the views that he calls combinatorial, Benacerraf includes
Hilbert's formalism; the (unnamed) view that "the truth conditions for
arithmetic sentences are given as their formal derivability from specified
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sets of axioms" (p. 665); the claim that "the Peano axioms are
'analytic' of the concept of number" (p. 665); conventionalist accounts;
and his own view, advanced in another well-known paper, that numerals are
3
not names. This does not seem to leave much to populate his first cate-
gory; indeed he says, "Many accounts of mathematical truth fall under
this [the combinatorial] rubric. Perhaps almost all." (p. 676) The one
specific example of a Platonistic view that he gives is that of G8del. 4
In calling the views in his first category "standard", perhaps Benacerraf
means to suggest that it is this philosophy of mathematics that lfiOSt of
us, who are not in the grip of one or another odd theory, subscribe to
or, perhaps, that most mathematicians subscribe to.
As is well-known, three positions dominated the classical controversy
over the foundations of mathematics during the first third of this century.
Of them, Benacerraf calls Hilbert's view combinatorial, but he mentions
neither intuitionism nor logicism. We will consider some doctrines in-
eluded in intuitionism in good time. For now it seems to fit comfortably
in neither category. Though it clearly does not suffer epistemological
failings of the sort Benacerraf finds in so-called standard views, I can-
not see how it can sensibly be called a combinatorial view. Logicism, on
the other hand, can fall into either category, depending on how it is
embellished. Benacerr~f scorns a kind of logicism in "What Numbers Could
3 Paul Benacerraf, "What Numbers Could Not Be," Philoso:ehical Review,
74 (1965), 47-73.
4 This view is defended in Kurt G8del, "What Is Cantor's Continuum
Problem," revised version in Philosophy of Mathematics, ~dc, Paul Bena-
cerraf and Hilary Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964),
pp. 258-273.
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Not Be," and that seems to throw it into the Platonist category. This is
the kind of (really a descendant of) logicism that portrays numbers as
particular sets and then goes on to propound a Platonistic philosophy of
set theory. In contrast, the logical positivists saw logicism as success-
fully reducing arithmetic to logic and then gave a conventionalist account
of logical truth. Their brand of logicism thus seems to be combinatorial,
on Benacerraf's telling. If this ambivalence seems puzzling, remember
that logicism, that is, the classic view of Frege in the Grundgesetze and
of Russell in Principia Mathematica and in his articles of the period of
Principia Mathematica, claims simply that mathematics is a part of, or can
be reduced to, logic. To the extent that Frege and Russell advanced views
on the nature of logical truth in these writings, their views had very
little in common.
Benacerraf's difficulty in specifying members of his first category
of philosophies of mathematics, the so-ca.l1ed standard or Platonistic
views, reflects an even deeper running difficulty in clarifying the notion
of a satisfactory semantics for mathematics, a concern for which supposed-
ly motivates these views, to the exclusion of right-minded epistemological
concerns. What is the first horn of Benacerraf's dilemma? And what is
Benacerraf's conception of a semantics for mathematics? He initially
mentions "the concern for having a homogeneous semantical theory in which
semantics for the propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics for
the rest of the language" (p. 661). This characterization leaves unstated
what Benacerraf takes to be included in a semantic theory. We might try
to infe~ what is required by looking at a formulation of the semantics
for the rest of the language, but Benacerraf tells us that he is
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"indulging here in the fiction that we have semantics for 'the rest of
language,'" or at least in the fiction that proponents of the standard
view think that they have "such semantics, at least for philosophically
important segments of the language" (p. 661, n. 1). Evidentallya homo-
geneous semantic theory is not something readily available.
A few pages later Benacerraf gives his full account of this horn of
the dilemma as a "condition" on a comprehensive philosophy of mathematics.
He describes it as "the requirement that there be an over-all theory of
truth in terms of which it can be certified that the account of mathe-
matical truth is indeed an account of mathematical truth" (p. 666). A
few sentences later Benacerraf reformulates this condition, as follows.
Another way of putting this first requirement is to demand that
any theory of mathematical truth be in conformity with a gen-
eral theory of truth--a theory of truth theories, if you like--
which certifies that the property of sentences that the account
calls "truth" is indeed truth. (p. 666)
These passages clearly indicate that Benacerraf's semantical condi-
tion on an adequate philosophy of mathematics requires an account of
mathematical truth, that is, an account of truth in respect of the sen-
tences, or propositions, or whatever bears truth and falsity, of arith-
metie and the rest of mathematics. Equally clearly though, Benacerraf
requires something more of an adequate philosophy of mathematics than
just this. What is not clear is what it is that he requires in addition.
Somehow the account of mathematical truth must accord with more general
philosophical claims about truth, in order to certify mathematical truth
as genuine truth. Thus begins what seems to me the fairest and most
intelligible interpretation of what Benacerraf first requires of the
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philosophy of mathematics; in Section VI we will return to this theme and
elaborate it considerably. For now I will merely reprove describing thj.s
desideratum as a semantics for mathematics that parallels the semantics
for the rest of language. Philosophers beginning with Tarski have had
reason enough for calling the theory of truth (a part of) semantics, but
we will see how misleading this practice has been.
Benacerraf's additional remarks make it unclear that his first re-
quirement is as I have just now construed it. Let us survey some of his
other characterizations of his semantical requirement. Shortly following
our last quotation, in evident even if hesitant elaboration, Benacerraf
says,
Perhaps the applicability of this requirement to the present
case '.amounts only to a plea that the semantical apparatus of
mathematics be seen as part and parce~ of that of the natural
language in which it is done, and thus that whatever semantica!
account we are inclined to give of names or, more generally, of
singular terms, predicates, and quantifiers in the mother
tongue include those parts of the mother tongue which we classi-
fy as m&thematese. (p. 666)
Benacerraf has quite unconsciously switched from talking about a theory
of truth for mathematics to talking about accounts of the semantics of
singular terms, predicates, and quantifiers in our language generally and
in our language as it is used to formulate mathematical propositions.
MOreover he has apparently switched in the belief that no change of sub-
ject has occurred. He seems to believe. that a theory of mathematical
truth is the same thing as a semantica! account of singular terms, predi-
cates, and quantifiers. It remains ahead for us to consider what
accounts of the semantics of these various categories of expression
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consist in. It will become clear that I believe that such accounts form
no part of a theory of truth, and that I am inclined to believe that a
theory of truth forms no part of any of them.
In the process of illustrating possible responses to his semantical
requirement, Benacerraf makes other remarks that equally raise questions
. about what would constitute a satisfactory semantics for mathematics and
about the relations between various semantic notions. To focus discus-
sion, Benacerraf displays three sentences, one whose subject is geography,
one whose subject is arithmetic, and one that is schematic:
(1) There are at least three large cities older than New York.
(2) There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17.
(3) There are at least three F G'S that bear R to a.
Benacerraf first asks, "Do [(1) and (2)] have the same logicogrammatical
form? More specifically, are they both.of the form (3)?" A few lines
later he asks, "What are the truth conditions of (1) and (2)?" Apparent-
ly in reply to this, he soon says, n[I]t seems clear that (3) accurately
reflects the form of (1)~" But then, evidently intending a contrast, he
asks, "But what of (2)1 May we use (3) in the same way as a matrix in
spelling out the conditions of its truth?" (All pp. 663-664.) Renacerraf
seems to be suggesting either that the notion of the logical form of (1)
and of (2) is the same thing as the notion of the truth conditions of (1)
and of (2) or else that some common answer can be give~ to questions
about the logical form of (1) and (2) and about the truth conditions of
(1) and (2).
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Having asked whether we may use (3) "as a matrix in spelling out the
conditions" of the truth of (2), Benacerraf goes on to illustrate replies
to this question. He fir·st says, "Some • • • have shied away from sup-
posing that numerals are names and thus, by implication, that (2) is of
the form (3)." Next, a few aentences later, he says of Hilbert, "[H]e
did not regard all quantified statements semantically on a par with one
another. A semantics for arithmetic as he viewed it • • • would certain-
ly not treat the quantifier in (2) in the same way as the quantifier in
(1)." And finally, still in illustration of possible replies, Benacerraf
says, "On other such accounts, the truth conditions for arithmetic sen-
tences are given as their formal derivability from specified sets of
axioms." (All pp. 664-665.) These passages, coming on the very heels of
one another, seem to conflate several notions. Dropping the theory of
mathematical truth altogether, the passages quite unsystematically inter-
sperse talk of the logical form and the truth conditions of sentences and
of the semantics of singular terms and of'quantifiers.
Many other passages from the article can be cited to demonstrate that
Benacerraf's articulation of a semantical requirement on the philosophy
of mathematics combines the notion of an acceptable account of mathe-
matical truth with at least four other distinct notions, summarized as
follows:
(1) The notion of a theory of the logical form of sentences whose
subject is arithmetic, specifying in particular the logical
forms of those sentences that say that there are numbers satis-
fying certain conditions.
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(2) The notion of an account of the semantics of numerals and other
singular terms in the language of arithmetic.
(3) The notion of an explanation of the semantics of the quanti-
fiers in the language of arithmetic.
(4) The notion of a formulation of truth conditions for an arith-
metic statement.
Benacerraf can be acquitted of merely confusing these notions only on the
supposition that we have reason to expect a complete and unified semantic
theory which includes a theory of truth as well as some component or
other fulfilling each of the notions (1) through (4). In fact, though he
never unequivocally spells it out this way, Benacerraf perhaps intends .his
semantical requirement on the philosophy of mathematics as the require-
ment not merely of a theory of truth, but of exactly that kind of compre-
hensive semantic theory.
Certainly Benacerraf is not alone in combining these notions. The
very ease with which the passages mentioned glide by on a first reading
measures the frequency with which these notions are conflated by philo-
sophers of language. I believe that confusion is born of speaking at all
of the semantics of a particular expression or class of expressions.
There are questions about expressions that are syntactic--that of the
grammaticality of a particular expression, for example. There seem to be
questions about expressions that are pragmatic, though these are somewhat
controversial. Grice has claimed that the relation of implicature be-
tween sentences is a matter of pragmatics, and Goodman has claimed that
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only a pragmatic account of the projectibility of predicates can be ex-
pected to succeed. Equally there are questions about expressions that
are semantic. Philosophers usually count questions of meaning, reference,
analyticity, and entailment, as well as questions of truth, as all being
semantic questions. I have no quarrel with this familiar classification,
nor with the criteria that underlie it. With minor qualifications, I
agree that issues about logical form as well as issues about the nature
of mathematical truth are semantic issues insofar as they are issues in
the philosophy of language; that is to say, they are semantic issues
rather than syntactic or pragmatic issues. Perhaps I even agree that in
some sense a completely satisfactory philosophical view would be required
to include a semantic theory that settled all such issues, as well as
answering all questions about meaning, reference, and entailment. But I
am sure that this is a utopian requirement. It is a requirement only in
the sense that nothing short of perfection can be completely satisfactory.
No one has even begun to construct such a comprehensive semantic theory
for any language of any complexity, whether for expressing mathematical
propositions or others. And certainly no extant position in the phi.lo-
sophy of mathematics carries with it such a comprehensive semantic theory.
In Sections II through V, I explore the four notions listed above in
order. In addressing each of them~ it is important to keep in mind the
questions whether the notion is one about which various philosophies of
mathematics draw importantly different conclusions, and whether the at-
tempt to construct the relevant account would be likely to lead a philo-
sopher to a Platonistic conception of mathematics. In these sections, I
argue that the several notions are conceptually distinct, that accounts
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of each type are, with respect to content, more or less independent of
one another and independent of the theory of truth, that the notion of a
statement of truth conditions is perhaps not philosophically significant,
and that in any case no comprehensive semantic theory embracing all of
these notions is to be expected on the basis of current achievements.
II. THE LOGICAL FORM OF ARITHMETIC SENTENCES
The question of logical form, in particular of the logical form of
Benacerraf's sentence (2), surely cannot be the point of any interesting
. 5dispute in the philosophy of mathematics. This will be the essential
conclusion of the upcoming considerations, but keeping in mind our 1n-
terest in disentangling various semantic notions, we want to survey the
notion of logical form with some breadth. Along the way, I will defend
these several other claims. Though an account of truth for many parti-
cular mathematical languages can be expected to begin on a bas~.s that
makes questions of logical form unproblematic, an account of logical form
is distinct from an account of truth. An account of the logical form of
the members of some set of sentences may also be distinct from an account
of the semantics of various categories of subsentential expressions, like
quantifiers or singular terms, though there are cases where it will not
be. From my unequivocal tone, one might conclude that the notion of logi-
cal form is clear and unproblematic. Nothing could be further from the
truth. It is not even clearly proper to speak of the logical form of (2),
5 See p. 89 above.
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or of any other sentence. Nevertheless, whatever is unclear or in dispute
about the notion of logical form is not likely to affect its relationship
to the other notions in which we are interested. Let us now investigate
these claims in the reverse order of this summary.
Logical theorists invariably appeal to the notion of logical form
with more assurance than that with which they explain it. At worst a
definitive theory of logical form would require a solution of the most
intractable problems of meaning and translation. At best it would depend
on demarcating the scope of logic, that is, determining which inferences
are licensed by logic alone and which truths are logical truths. In an
unpublished paper Richard Cartwright has pointed out that neither the
notion of logical form nor the more modest notion of difference in logi-
cal form have been elucidated by philosophers who use these notions. 6
More importantly, he has argued that elucidations of them utilizing prop-
erly modest logical devices are not likely to capture what we intuitively
expect of the concept of logical form.
Insofar as we understand it at all, logical form is inferred from
the inferences that we recognize as valid. The idea of logical form in-
forms what is derivatively called formal logic. The idea is to develop
a method of schematic representation for sentences such that combinatorial
or otherwise algorithmic operations on these schematic representations
will yield verdicts on such questions important to logic as validity, im-
plication, and logical equivalence. A system of such schematic represen-
tations typically comprises what we usually call a formal system, what
6 Richard Cartwright, "On the Concept of Logical Form," TS.
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used to be called a logistical system. From the standpoint of anyone of
these formal systems, we would say that the logical form of a given sen-
tence in English is exhibited by the formula that represents it schemati-
cally and that two sentences have the same logical form when they are
schematically rep~esented by the same formula. Of course no given sen-
tence need be schematically represented by only one formula, even within
a single formal system. After all, every sentence is an instance of the
formula, 'P'. But the schematic resources of at least many formal systems
are exhausted before schematization has gone very far, and within any such
system we can say more precisely that two sentences have the same logical
form when they share all of their schematic representations and that the
logical form of a particular sentence is that formula, of all those of
which it is an instance, that has the fewest instances. (Actually even
this much does not isolate the logical form; witness '(~x)Fx' versus
'(:ax)Gx' .)
Two kinds of problem arise for this approach to logical form. Com-
mentators agree that it is prior recognition of inferential relations that
7guides this kind of theorizing. But this prior recognition does not fix
~he results of the theory. In the first place there may be crucial dis-
agreements about the selection of some inferential relations as purely
logical relations. And in the second place, even ~ fixed determination of
the logical relations that the theory must reflect does not fix the
7 See, for example, Gilbert Harman, "Logical Form," Foundations of
Language, 9 (1972), 38-65; rpt:,in The Logic of Grammar, ed. Donald
Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975), pp. 289-307.
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assigament of logical form to the sentences under consideration.
Let us begin with the second pr~blem. Suppose we agree about the
purely logical relations that hold between members of an arbitrary set of
sentences. How do we assign formulae to these sentences? Remember that
our sketch used the notions of a formula schematically representing a
sentence and, inversely, a sentence being an i~:stance of a formula. What
is the relation here being invoked1 The deepest problem of philosophical
analysis threatens to obstruct an explanation. Hoping to parry this
threat, Cartwright assesses adequacy conditions that might be imposed on
the relation, specifically considering these two:
(1) The (combinatorially expressible) logical relations on the
schematic representations mirror those already determined to
hold among the sentences at hand; and
(2) The truth values of the sentences at hand are reflected by
some interpretation, in a model-theoretic or otherwise precisely
specified sense, of the schematic representations.
Cartwright suggests that these adequacy conditions are not strong
enough to exclude obviously unwanted candidates for the representation
relation. To see what he has in mind, consider the set containing the
sentence, 'Every number is even'; the sentence, 'Some number is even';
and the one thousand different sentences that can he constructed by re-
placing the variable in 'v is even' by a decimal numeral from '1' to
'lOaD'. ~~3t we want to do is to constri ,~t a perverse furction from
these sentences to some set of formulae that clearly are not the ones we
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want. Here is a schematization function that will do:
f('Every number is even') = 'pI;
f(rv is even') = rp V Tv' or rp v Fv~' depending on whether v names
an even number or~an odd number;
f('Some number is even') = 'P v T1 v • • v T1000 v F1 v . ·
v F1000 V R'.
Now we assign truth values to the sentence letters in those formulae, so
as to reflect the actual truth values of the sentences:
I('P') = Falsity;
I(TT ') = Truth, for all values of V;
v
I(rF ') = Falsity, for all values of V;
v
I('R') = Truth.
This schematization function and interpretation together satisfy both of
the adequacy conditions--(l) and (2), above--that Cartwright imposes on
8
the relation of schematic representation. Yet clearly these formulae
from the propositional calculus do not schematically represent the
8 It should be obvious how to tinker w1.th the schematization func-
tion and interpretation to handle an arbitrary finite set of sentences
constructed from a single predicate and a finite stock of singular terms
by analogy with this set.
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sentences we began with.
~~e insufficiency of the conditions, (1) and (2), leaves us wonder-
ing what further adequacy conditions could be imposed to isolate the
relation of schematic representation. This is the central question that
Cartwright calls to our attention. (He does not try to answer it.)
We saw that the standard approach to logical form uses a system of
formulae to represent sentences schematically. Combinatorial manipula-
tion of these formulae is expected to capture the inferential relations
that actually hold among the sentences. Let us return now to the first
problem that we raised for this approach, namely that there is room for
disagreement about which inferential relations between the given sentences
are purely logical. Differences over the prior classification of infer-
ential relations arise even when there is no dispute about the actual
truth values of the sentences under consideration and would remain in
spite of agreement about which are their possible combinations of truth
values. These differences reflect philosophical disagreement about the
9
scope of logic. Logical theorists disagree about how deep a schematiza-
tion can go and still remain a ~ogical schematization. Can the schema-
tization capture second-order inferences, for example? And can it find
structure within the boundaries of single words? These are well-known
uncertainties. An interesting one suggested by remarks of Quine is
10
similar. We are quick to conclude that Mary is sibling to Martha,
9Cartwright is pe~fectly well aware of this, discussing it on p. 7.
10 Willard Va~. Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T.
Press, 1960), p. 182.
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given that Martha is sibling to Mary. Should our logical resources
enable us to capture this inference? Should we have special schematic
letters for symmetrical relations and a corresponding rule of inference:
Given 'xSy', infer 'ySx'. Or is the symmetry of brother-Dr-sisterhood a
nonlogical fact that should be registered in an explicit premise, with
the schematic representative of the relation confined to the more usual
rules of inference? Different verdicts yield different formal systems.
The practical response of logical theorists to these difficulties is
modesty and relative tolerance. A variety of formal systems are pro-
pounded and employed. No one claims priority for one over all of the
others in point of correctness, in contr~st to ease of use, perspicuity,
ease of inculcation, or economy of apparatus. Within a favored system,
the student is taught logical schematization as a black art. And Quine
piously hopes that schematization will "present little difficulty to one
familiar with the canonical notation," inasmuch as he can "judge outright
11
whether his ends are served by the paraphrase." Even in our rough way
we have an account of logical form only relative to a system of schematic
12
representation. The plurality of such systems are not isomorphic to
11 Quine, Word and Object, p. 159.
12 For some systems we would not have even that. What if we take up
Quine's suggestion and add to it a similar device for transitive rela-
tions? Given the transitivity of (full) brother-or-sisterhood, two
schematic representations would be possible for 'Mary is sibling to
Martha', neither of them deeper or more basic than the other. (Actually
the transitivity of that relation is not given, for though Mary be
sibling to Martha and Martha be sibling to Mary, Mary is not sibling to
herself. Another relation could be found to more accurately illustrate
the point only at the price of artificiality.)
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one another because their formulae cannot be correlated in the necessary
way. For that reason the varying verdicts on the logical form of a par-
ticular sentence cannot be unified into one per sentence. Under pres-
sure, speaking of the unique logical form of a sentence collapses into
nonsense.
Even thus dimly understood, what relationship does this notion of
logical form bear to the semantics of singular terms or of the quanti-
fiers or of other categories of expression subordinate to the complete
sentence? A theory of logical form may have no bearing whatever on the
semantics of many such categories. For a case in point, notice that
traditional treatments of first-order (nonmodal) logic assigned so-called
individual constants to proper names without regard to questions about
rigid designation and about causal chains of reference. These questions
are now seen as central to the semantics of proper names, but the tradi-
tional treatments are no less viable for that. Since these semantic
questions are irrelevant to the class of inferences being formalized, no
answer to them is needed for the theory of logical form. And so 'in
general a theory of logical form may take the meanings or other seman-
tical properties of various types of expression as completely unproblem-
atic and thus unexplained or, on the other hand, ·as awaiting further
investigation. Except as these properties bear on inferential relations
captured by the theory, it can leave them unexplained. In doing so it
would assign to expressions in a particular category either a logical
particle or a schematic representative (whichever may be appropriate to
the expression at hand), with the result of licensing certain inferences
involving sentences containing those expressions and barring' others.
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In certain cases though, an account ot the semantics of a class of
expressions is intertwined with a theory of the logical form of containing
sentences. I have in mind cases where the expressions are given con-
textual definitions. The most familiar example is Russell's theory of
descriptions. Here we give an explanation of the semantic roleof definite
des'criptions by pairi.ng every ordinary sentence that contains a definite
description with a replacement incorporating the devices of quantification
and identity and lacking the definite description. The logical form of
the replacement is manifest. Precisely because the inferential relations
borne by sentences containing definite descriptions are complex and con-
troversial,accounts of logical form, which predict and account for these
inferential relations, delimit what can be said of their semantical
properties. But this interdependency should not be exaggerated. Precisely
because the definition thus given is a contextual definition, it bypasses
important questions about the meaning of definite descriptions. How is it
that the various morphemes comprising the description when combined in
this way with the rest of the sentence yield a whole that has the logical
relations that it does? Similarly the account of logical form can proceed
without defining denotation for definite descriptions, though other
purposes might make defining this semantic relation worthwhile. In no
wise are we justified in calling Russell's theory of descriptions a complete
semantical theory for definite des·criptions.
What of the relationship between accounts of logical form and theo-
ries of truth? For a modest enough language, truth could be defined
without paying attention to issues of logical form. So long as the
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language be finite, no matter how large, there is a theory of truth for
it that ignores the syntactic structure of its sentences. But in inter-·
eating cases, recursive rules of fOl·~ation generate the infinitude of
sentences in the language. Where these syntactic rules of formation are
well-behaved, an inductive truth definition can be specified, mimicking
the structure of the formation rules. Only formal languages are well-
behaved in this way, and of infinite languages only formal languages have
ever been provided truth definj.tions. Of course the sentences of these
languages wear their logical forms on their sleeves. For that reason,
I said that when a truth definition can be given, logical form 1s un-
problematic. Nonetheless, the definition of truth is not the same as
the account of logical form. The logical form of the sentences of a
formal language is implicit in their syntax. The truth definition only
begins with a specification of syntax.
Without at least a material . correlation of the sentences of a lan-
guage whose syntax was more complex to the sentences of a formal language,
no truth definition could be given for it. Would such a correlation ful-
fill any conceivable ad~quacy conditions for a theory of logical form and
thus implicitly be a theory of logical form? Or would the difficulties
Cartwright finds with plausible adequacy conditions haunt this case as
well, leaving us in the.dark about logical form even though we had an
extensionally correct truth definition? We cannot stay for an answer.
What is more important for us is that none of this uncertainty about
the notion of logical form and none of the particular disputes about the
best Gystem of schematizing this or that set of sentences correlate to
uncertainties in or disputes about the philosophy of mathematics. Arith-
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metie is the home of the modern analysis of first-order inference. All
of the early formal systems were developed with an eye to systematizing
the almost universally accepted inferential practice of mathematicians.
There is one important exception to this universal acceptance, namely,
intuitionism. Formal systems have their motivation and their justifica-
tion in capturing standard classifications of inferences. It is well-
known that intuitionists dissent from important examples of standard
classifications. But they do not express this specific dissent in terms
of logical form. Rather than rejecting particular schematizations of
various sentences, they reject particular syntactic rules that certify
inferences from several such sentences to a conclusion. For example,
they accept the usual schematization of two sentences as '~~p' and 'P',
but reject the rule licensing the inference of the second from the first.
Having said this much, we should return to Benacerraf's worries
about the logical form of (2), his typical arithmetic sentence. l3 It
seems clear that even when we have settled on the logical form of (2),
we must go further to find out what it means to say that (2) is true,
and that we will have hardly begun to explain the semantics of its com-
ponent expressions. And it seems clear that, given that we accept the
system of schematization exemplified by (3), and given that we use (3)
to represent the geographical sentence, (1), we would be silly to deny
that (3) is the representative of (2) as well. Presumably the logical
relations entered into by (2) are accounted for by means of (3), and
what more do we intend in thinking of (3) as giving the logical form
13 See p. 89, above.
104
of (2)1
III. THE SEMANTICS OF SINGULAR TERMS IN ARITIll1ETIC
Seeing Benacerraf inquire into the semantics of numerals and other
singular terms in the language of arithmetic, we most naturally wonder
about the relationship between theories of reference and theories of
truth. After all, Benacerraf sets up his semantica1 requirement as if
he expects there to be important relationships between the various seman-
tic accounts, and the notion of reference is perhaps the most trusted of
the semantical properties of singular terms.
The relationship between truth and reference and between theories of
14
each comprises the subject of "Field's Theory of Truth." What are the
relevant conclusions there formulated? One important conclusion for pre-
sent purposes is that only if a language is particularly simple can a
theory of truth be intelligibly based on a primitive notion of denotation.
Its singular terms must be limited to a so-called semantic category that
is rather clearly characterized by at least a rough criterion of denota-
tion for its elements. In asking for a unified account of the reference
of both numerals and singular terms that denote other sorts of things,
Benacerraf runs afoul of an important point made in that essay, namely,
that reference mediates so many different relata of so many different
kinds that we have a fix on what relation it is supposed to be only by
14 That is, the second part of this thesis, beginning p. 47, above.
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way of the disquotational paradigms: 'Socrates' refers to Socrates;
15
refers to n; and so on.
Equally importantly, we saw in "Field's Theory of Truth" that a
definition of truth that is completely independent of any prior notion of
reference can be given for any static language. The original theory of
Tarski, there paraphrased as T2, is an example of such a theory. Of
course, as we noted, an extensionally correct definition of denotation
can easily be formulated in the process of supplying that kind of theory
16
of truth. But such a definition of denotation will be unavoidably
parochial, bound to the vocabulary of the language under consideration
in its current state. It will hardly constitute a general theory of de-
notation, and it will neither issue from nor contribute to a comprehen-
sive semantic theorYe
Other aspects of the semantics of singular terms, for example, their
meanings, their designation across possible worlds, the circumstances
historically responsible for their referring to what they do or for their
meaning what they do, seem to be completely independent of the concept of
truth and of the theory of truth. And in considering logical form, we saw
that semantica! properties of singular terms mayor may not be independent
of a theory of logical form, depending on what singular terms are in-
valved. Contextual definitions of singular terms, as in the case of
Russell's theory of descriptions, implicate matters of logical form;
straight definitions do not.
15 See pp. 74-76, above.
16 See 59 bp. ., a ove.
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With regard to arithmetic singular terms in particular, the most
pressing semantica! issues have to do with numerals. B~nacerraf raises
the question whether numerals are names. They do not seem to be proper
names. Even in the absence of a characterization of proper names, there
seems to be a clear difference between proper names like 'Socrates',
'London', and 'Harvard', and numerals like '1' and '456'. In fact a case
could be made for regardin~ standard numerical desig~lators beyond '9' as
definite descriptions. On the other hand, numerals no doubt are rigid
designators, inasmuch as arithmetic consists entirely of necessary truths.
It seems that neither the question whether they are proper names nor the
question whether they are rigid designators can be what Benacerraf won-
ders about.
Perhaps Benacerraf means to be asking whether there are any things
to which numerals bear the denotation relation. My reply would be that
the standard definition of denotation (for example, (D) on p. 59:, above)
certainly makes it look like there is. For example, it looks at first
appearance like '12' denotes 12. But similarly it looks at first appear-
ance like the Apostles are numbered by 12. And yet philosophers have
called into question whether there is anything which the Apostles are
numbered by. Since no one wants to deny that we~ can use existential
generalization over numerals (Do they?), whatever is at stake depends on
the ontological force of the existential quantifier. This is an issue
that we will defer to our discussions of Platonism, in Section VII.
Rather than the dilemma that he does pose for the philosophy of
mathematics, Benacerraf migh.t well have posed another, this one ignoring
epistemological matters. Because he is tempted to expect that the
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standard semantics will base its theory of truth on a theory of reference,
I can imagine that .Benacerraf would be sympathetic to what has been
called the causal theory of reference. But the causal theory of refer-
ence seems itself to be incompatibl~ with Platonism, understood as the
doctrine that numbers are abstract entities whose existence is indepen-
dent of human thought. In light of difficulties about the explanatory
status of a causal theory of reference, we might just look at a minimal
causal theory, one that is only extensional: Is there a causal relation
extensionally equivalent to the denotation relation for numerals? Or
more modestly, even for the numerals from '0' through '9'? I suppose that
there is not, given that the numbers are abstract and do not enter tntu
causal relations. 17And so much the worse for the causal theory. In
any case~ though this mathematical issue grows out of considerations
about the semantics of numerals, it is a parochial one that only arises
on a particularly strong conception of the standard semantics for mathe-
matics.
In summary, I have argued that, despite Benacerraf's hopes, there is
no reason. to expect that a theory of truth will be founded upon a theory
of reference in an interesting way, that doubts about whether numerals
denote numbers are no different from other doubts about the reality of
numbers and need be handled in no different way, and that the causal
theory of reference is inc0mpatible with the ordinary characterization of
17 I ~uspect that this dilemma, as much as Benacerraf's official
dilemma,.motivates Field's nominalism in Science without Numbers. Of
course there have been attempts to locate numbers in the causal relations
that are supposed.to underlie knowledge; I think of Steiner. These same
efforts might be effective against my more narrow dilemma.
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numbers as abstract objects. I can find no other issue in t;1e philosophy
of mathematics that has much to do with the semantics of numerals and
other singular terms in arithmetic. ¥oundational positions in the philo-
sophy of mathematics did not speak to the question of the semantics of
numerals or other singular terms, except wholeheartedly to embrace
Russell's theory of descriptions as a part of the formalization of mathe-
matical reasoning. Logici~m and formalism both accepted mathematical
formalization; intuitionisrn rejected the whole package, the theory of
descriptions included. Now let us turn to questions about the semantics of
quantifiers in arithmetic, asking whether these questions significantly
relate to the theory of truth.
IV. THE SEMANTICS OF QUANTIFIERS
It is difficult to guess what Benacerraf has in mind when he speaks
of a s~mantic account of the quantifiers in arithmetic. What seems to be
called for is ~ definition of the quantifiers as they appear in the lan-
guage of arithmetic, but obviously the kind of definition appropriate for
a term or a relation, or even for a connective, will not do. Quantifiers
are operators that (when successively applied) turn open sentences lacking
truth values into closed sentenCtS having truth values. They are insepa-
rable from the variables or other pronuminal devices that they bind.
GlveT* this, perhaps they could be explained cn the model of the semantical
explanation of definite descriptions. Contextual definition seems the
only kind of definition possible for an operator. As such the definition
would, f01' any sentence in which quantifiers occur, generate an
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equivalent in which no quantifiers occur, and would do so by some systeln-
atic means. So far as I know there is no correct account of the quanti-
fiers on this construal, either for the language of arithmetic or for any
other language that is powerful enough to describe an infinite domain.
Only a few have thought this kind of definition of the quantiti~rs vossi-
ble--I think of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus--and for that reason only
a few have even tried to construct one.
Nevertheless, questions about the nature of the quantifiers have
been at the center of important philosophical disputes in the century
since Frege first enunciated a logical theory that employed quantifiers
and systematized quantifieational inference. The philosophy of mathe-~
18
maties has been a particularly frequent scene of these disputes. Fur-
ther discussion of the quantifiers and the philosophy of mathematics,
focused on the question of the ontological force of the existential quan-
tifier, appears in my treatment of Platonism. There we will be asking
whether mathematical objects can be exp1ai~ed away, while the sta.tements
of mathematics retain their truth values. (See pp. 156-158, below.)
~\nother kind of semantic account has often been thought relevant to
these disputes. I ·refer to the familiar proceedings which are usually'
described as specifying the semantics of a formal system and which include
elements devoted to the quantifiers. These proceedings occur in almost
.;~
any serious exposjtion of formal logic; a particularly compact and easily
18 For a thought provoking acc~unt of some little known aspects of
these disputes, see Warren D. Goldfarb, "Logic in the Twenties: The Na-
ture of the Quantifier," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 44 (1979),
351-358.
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19identified instance occurs in Mates' Elementary Logic. The point of
this exercise is to provide an interpretation or a number of interpreta-
tions for the formal system. The purpose of providing interpretations in
the technical sense exemplified, could be either one of two:
(1) Converting a meanin31ess formal system into a meaningful formal
language, or
(2) Artificially assigning truth values (under the interpretation)
to formulae in a way that is systematically related to the
possible truth values of the ordinary statements that they
represent."
If the formal system is newly introduced and so far only syntactically
determined, the process of supplying an interpretation gives life to an
heretofore flat and meaningless system of symbols. For those who think
specifying conditions of the truth of a statement adequate to render it
fully meaningful, an interpretation is seen to convert the meaningless
formulae of a formal system into sentences of ·a fully meaningful formal
language, thus serving the first purpose. Of course this requires that
the interpretation span the whole formal system, as it typically does.
The second purpose, that of artificially assigning truth values, is
served even for those who deny that fixing truth conditions is sufficient
to give meaning to an otherwise meaningless symbolism. Explaining what
19 Benson Mates, Elementary Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1972), p. 60.
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an interpretation is, and doing it in such a way as to make evident what
are the range of possible interpretations, gives content to the standard
definitions of validity, implication, and logical equivalence for for-
mulae of a formal system, definitions expressed in terms of possible
interpretations of the formulae. The cogency of these definitions
depends not on the assumption that the formulae 80 intepreted themselves
become fully meaningful sentences, but only on another assumption that is
usually unstated. The crucial assumption is that for each statement of
the informal language of ordinary discourse, we can be sure that the for-
mula which schematically represents it has the same truth value as the
ordinary statement, under some interpretation which is systematically
related to the ordinary statement. Part of the systematic relation, for
example, is that the class assigned by the interpretation to a predicate
letter be the extension of the corresponding predicate of the ordinary
sentence.
Two kinds of misconception easily develop about such semantical
accounts of formal systems. The first 1s that to provide a semantics in
this way is to providea definition of truth of the sort that Tarski pro-
vided in his well-known theory of truth. Though he no doubt did not suf-
fer this misconception himself, Mates introduced the semantics for his
formal system using a phrasing that may be one source of this confusion.
The relevant section of his text is entitled "Truth," and he begins,
Next we wish to make clear what it means to say that a sentence
of ~ is true or false with respect to a given interpretation of
L. In other words, we seek to give an exact definition of the
locution
~ is true under I,
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where the values of '~' are sentences of L and the values of
'I' are intepretations of L.21
The promise to define "4> is true under I" can easily be misconstl:ued as
a promise to define truth itself. The misconstrual is reinforced by the
fact that the definition of truth under an interpretation is structurally
very similar to Tarski's definition of truth itself, or more accurately,
of truth in a language.
Against this first misconception, I contend that a specification of
formal semantics does not serve as an explanatory definition of the con-
ce~t of truth. A simple argument for this contention is the observance
that truth under an interpretation is not the same thing as truth. Yet
there is a view that this mere .. observation will not defeat. I have in
mind the view that the formal semantics does effectively define truth for
the formal languages, but only when what we have seen so far is supple-
mented by choosing one of the intepretations as the intended one. Then
the formulae would be true or false as they were true or false under that
special interpretation. My reply to this view depends on reminding our-
selves of the two possible purposes of formal semantics outlined above,
namely, either giving meaning to the formulae or else artificially assign-
ing truth values to the formulae under various interpretations, which
systematically mirror the various possible truth values of the corres-
ponding ordinary sentences. Giving meaning to an otherwise meaningless
formula by providing truth conditions for it depends for its efficacy on
a prior understanding of what truth is. Similarly, mirroring the truth
21 Mates, Elementary Logic, p. 57.
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values of ordinary sentences by assigning truth values to a schematic
representation under an interpretation that is systematically related to
the structure of the ordinary sentence is of no value in the absence of
an understanding of what truth and falsity regarding the statements of
the ordinary language are all about. The point of Tarski's definition
of the concept of truth, and, I suppose, of any other philosophical elu-
cidation of truth, is this prior one of providing the background undel:'-
standing of truth.
The second common misconception about semantical accounts of formal
systems is that those clauses of such accounts that are devoted to the
quantifiers constitute an explanation of the semantics of quantifiers
generally. Those who think of truth conditions as sufficient for the
explanation of meaning are particularly susceptible to this misconception,
inasmuch as the clauses in question do provide truth conditions for quan-
tified formulae of the formal system. Let us take that clause in Mates'
formal semantics which is devoted to the existential quantifier as an
illustration. It says,
If cI> = 0Ia)t/J, then ep is true under I if and only if t/J 0./6 is
true under at least one a-variant of 1. 22
Now I grant that if providing truth conditions is sufficient for confer-
ring meaning, and if the point of the formal semauticq is to confer mean-
ing on an otherwise meaningless formalism, then this clause does confer
22 Mates, Elementary Logic, p. 60. My point does not depend on an
understanding of Mates' notions expressed by the notations, ''lp ex / a" and
"a-variant".
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meaning on those formulae that are existential quantifications. But its
doing so depends on a prior understanding of existential quantification
in another language, namely the language in which the formal semantics
are stated, which usually is a natural language. The obvious reason is
that the clause quoted makes use of such an existential quantification,
articulated in the words "at least one a-variant". And so the clause
does not serve as an explanation of existential quantification in general.
On the weaker presupposition that meaning is not conferred by the speci-
fication of truth conditions, or that the formal semantics is not intend-
ed to make formulae Dleaningful anyway, but merely to define an otherwise
useful notion of truth undeL an interpretation, there is no justifi.cation
whatever for the idea that the existential quantifier clause contributes
to a general explanation of the semantics of the quantifiers.
Since surveying Benacerraf's dilemma in Section I, we have consider-
ed the notions of a theory of logical form, of an account of the semantics
of numerals and other arithmetic singular terms, and of an account of the
quantifiers. We have distinguished all of them from the notion of a
theory of truth and assessed their own prospects along the way. The re-
maining notion on our list, one which Benacerraf often employs in ex-·
pounding his dilemma, is that of a formulation of truth conditions of an
arbitrary arithmetic statement. In this section, we have seen a dubious
appeal to the notion of truth conditions in connection with endowment of
meaning, so it is appropriate now to turn to that notion.
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v. THE CALL FOR TRUTH CONDITIONS
In many passages Benacerraf asks after the truth conditions of
typical arithmetical statements. His doing so calls to mind the frequent
appeal to the notion of truth conditions in contemporary philosophical
inquirieR, particularly in inquiries into the theory of meaning, and even
more particularly in inqutries into the mealling ·of mathematical state-
ments. What is it that BenacLrraf is asking after? What are truth con-
ditions, anyway?
Our first temptation is to think that by "truth conditions" must be
meant necessary and sufficient conditions for truth. This supposition
fits Benacerraf's inquiry into a long tradition according to which philo-
sophical insight is achieved through discovering necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of some central concept. Unfortunately
the notion of necessary and sufficient conditions itself conceals an
important distinction. Sticking with the case in point, when we say that
some condition is necessary and sufficient for truth, we may mean merely
that if the condition holds for a statement, then the statement is true,
and conversely, if a statement is true, then the condition holds for
it. So to give necessary and sufficient conditions for truth is to sup-
ply an extensionally correct definition of truth.' To insure that the
definition is not trivial by reason ot circularity, we usually require
that the condition not itself make use of the notion of truth. Departing
from this weak sense of necessary and sufficient conditions, many philos-
ophers find mere coe~tensiveness inadequate for their purposes in seeking
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conditions for a concept. For them the necessity of necessary conditions
is to be taken seriously. A genuine definition of a concept, they say,
does not merely specify those things which happen to fall under the con-
cept; it must capture the meaning of the concept and thereby provide an
explanation why these things and no others do fall under the concept.
These philosophers seek, under the description "necessary and sufficient
conditions", what has in this century been called a philosophical analy-
sis of the concept and thereby clearly commit themselves to the troubling
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
Having distinguished this stronger notion of necessary and sufficient
conditions, we will be aided in the ensuing discussion by noting some
candidates for necessary and sufficient conditions for truth in at least
the weaker sense of extensional equivalence. There follow several exam-
ples.
(1) It may well be a necessary and 'sufficient condition for the
truth of any statement that God believe it. If you suspect the
condition of covertly appealing to the concept of truth ftself,
take God to be a proper name devoid of meaning, or take it to
mean the creator of the world, rather than taking it to mean
an omnipotent, omniscient being.
(2) In the case of a syntactically complete mathematical theory, it
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of any
statement in the theory that it be a logical consequenc~ of the
axioms.
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(3) In the case of a language consisting of all the simple Noun
Phrase-Verb Phrase sentences generated from the noun phrases
'roses' and 'violets' and the verb phrases 'are red' and 'are
blue', it is a necessary and sufficient· condition for the truth
of any statement e~pressible in the language that it be ex-
pressed either by 'roses are red', or by 'violets are blue'.
(4) It is a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of any
statement expressible in the language specified in (3) that one
of the following hold:
(a) 'Roses are red' expresses the statement in question, and
what's more, roses are red;
(b) 'Roses are blue' expresses the statement, and roses are
blue;
(c) 'Violets are red' expresses the statement, and violets
are red;
(d) 'Violets are blue' expresses the statement, and violets
are blue.
(5) It is a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of any
statement expressible in the language of (3) that, with refer-
ence to the sentence expressing it, the entities denoted by the
noun phrase satisfy the verb phrase.
It should be amply evident that formulating necessary and sufficient
conditions for the truth of statements expressible in Borne language or
other is not a very difficult task. As is illustrated by (3), (4), and
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(5), there need not be only one such set of conditions. A further illus-
tration would be provided by an alternative axiomatization of the theory
in (2). And nothing precludes conditions for the theory in (2) of the
sorts illustrated by (4) and (5), or at least by a familiar extrapolation
of th.em to handle infinite languages. Of course, if it turns out that (1)
succesAfully mentions an omniscient being, it provides truth conditions
for all statements irrespective of the expressive power of particular
languages.
In giving a philosophical account of truth one must face the central
problem of distinguishing among the many sets of necessary and sufficient
conditions, in at least the weaker sense, that could be formulated. A
theory of truth presumably will provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, but in order to be philosophically illuminating, it must do more
than this. What more can reasonably be required ot a definition of truth
than mere extensional correctness in a question to be asked (and answered)
23in our next section. But let us note now that there is no reason to
expect the requirements to lead to what would traditionally have been
called an analysis of the concept of truth, namely analytically necessary
and suffic~ent conditions. By way of confirmation, we should notice ~hat
no one of our five examples qualifies as an analysis.
Benacerraf often speaks of the truth conditions of mathematical
statements, as if there were only one set of necessary and sufficient
cond~tions common and peculiar to mathematical statements. In other
passages though (for example, p. 666), he speaks of a truth condition,
23 See pp. 127-128, below.
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apparently recognizing what we have emphasized, that there are many sets
of conditions for truth. However we understand him on this SCOI'e, we must
guard against one suggestion we may be left with. In introducing his
epistemological requirement, Benacerraf says, "the conditions of the truth
of mathematical propositions cannot make it impossible for us to know
that they are satisfiedH (p. 667). We might wonder whether, if (1) turns
out to hold good, the knowability of mathematical propositions is not
threatened. If the condition of the truth of some proposition is that
God b~lieves it, isn't it impossible for us to know tllat this condition
is satisfied? After all, isn't God inscrutable to man? Of course tae
proper reply will be that one set of conditions may seem inacessible to
mere mortals, while another is quite accessible. (Of course if the otheL
is accessible, the first will turn out, cO~ltrary to appearances, to be
accessible too, though indirectly, supposing of course that they both
really a~e known to be necessary and sufficient conditions for truth.)
Truth conditions of the type of (1) or even of the type of (5) may seem
quite impossible of general determinatio~, while those of type (2) wouldbe
quite easily determined in many cases. So long as conditions of the type
of (4) are included among the alternatives, there should never be any
general obstacle to knowledge growing out of conditions on truth.
When Beaacerraf asks after the truth conditions of particular aritb-
methic statements, as we saw him do earlier, he seems to expect a differ-
24
ent answer for each statement. The idea seems to be that each part1cu-
lar statement has its own truth conditions, distinct from those of other
24 See p. 89, above.
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statements, even other statements expressible in the same language. This
idea may not be borne out on the characterization of truth conditions
that we have so far considered. If (1) does not fail of reference, and
if God indeed is omniscient, then the condition for the truth of every
statement will be that God believe it. This necessary and sufficient
condition for the truth of any statement whatever makes use of no peculiar
properties of given statements; neither structural, inferential, semanti-
cal, nor any other peculiar properties are exploited in the truth con-
dition. For that reason the general statement of truth conditions in (1)
does not entail distinct truth conditions for distinct stateme~ts. Sim-
ilarly, from the general condition of derivability from a set of axioms
set out in (2), there follow no particular derivability properties for
the distinct true statements of the mathematical theory. Yet in inter-
changing the notion of the truth conditions of a statement with that of
its logical form, and in expecting the truth conditions to be determined
by or importantly related to the semantical properties of the expressions
that make up the sentence, Benacerraf takes it for granted that the truth
conditions will be particularized. In order to maintain contact with the
traditional notion of general necessary and sufficient conditions, in
this case conditions on truth, he must expect the general condition to
entail distinct conditions on the truth of distinct statements. Benacer-
raf has this expectation in common, I believe, with a prominent strain of
contemporary philosophical discussion that makes heavy use of a particu-
larized conception of truth conditions. A fact complicating our discus-
sion is that this strain is devoted primarily to investigating and gen-
eralizing issues in the philosophy of mathematics. I have in mind the
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the explorations of contemporary philosophers of language into the theory
of meaning, and the general contrast that they draw between truth-condi-
tional and verificationist theories of meaning.
An analysis and assessment of this strain of discussion would take
us far outside the focus of this study. I mention it only in order to
acknowledge the relevance to issues in the philosophy of mathematics of
the notion of the truth conditions of a statement, the relevance in par-
ticular of the question whether an explanation of meaning can be given in
terms of truth conditions. I have no doubt that Benacerraf does not have
this question in mind when he asks after the truth conditions of particu-
lar arithmetical statements. Nevertheless, there is something to be
learned from considering truth-conditional accounts of meaning, something
regarding the possibility of formulating philosophically interesting
truth conditions for individual arithmetic statements. Though Benacerraf
never calls for a truth-conditional account of meaning, he does seem to
think that something would be explained by the particular truth conditions
of arithmetic statements.
The truth-table account of a sentential connective is a paradigm
case of a truth-conditional specification of meaning. What a truth table
for the material conditional tells us, to consider an example, is that a
conditional sentence is true if the antecedent and consequent are both
true, or the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, or the ante-
dedent and consequent are both false, and that the sentence is false if
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. This is not itself
an account of truth conditions peculiar to an individual sentence, but it
easily results in one: 'if roses are red, then violets are blue' is true
122
if 'roses are red' and 'violets are blue' are both true, and so on. What
is instructive about this example is that the conditions of truth speci-
fied for the particular sentence are informative, even for someone who
does not understand the sentence or who has never before seen the materi-
al conditional. Specifically, the truth conditions are not expressed by
means of the se~tence under consideration. Furthermore, some simplifica-
tion has occurred. Whereas the conditional sentence might be said to
describe a complex state of affairs, the truth-conditional account of it
is given by means of descriptions of simpler states of affairs. (Perhaps
this claim can be supported only if the truth conditions are reformulated
using semantic descent, 'roses are red' replacing '''roses are red" is
true' in the statement of truth conditions, and similarly with the other
clauses.)
Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect to be able to imitate,
with respect to arbitrary sentences, the truth-conditional account of
the meanings of complex truth-functional sentences. Only on the basis
of metaphysical or linguistic doctrines that are not widely held could we
expect a truth-conditional account of every given sentence that was both
systematic and informative. One example of a philosopher who could seri-
ously inquire into the truth conditions of particular propositions was
Wittgenstein in the period of the Tractatus. According to the doctrine
of that work, an informative and illuminating response can be given to
the question, "What are its truth conditions?" asked of an arbitrary prop-
osition, but only by reason of, (1) the truth-functional nature of all
complex propositions, (2) the existence of states of affairs, and (3) the
picture theory of elementary propositions.
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Bereft of these presuppositions, or others equally problematic, as
I suppose Benacerraf is, along with most of the rest of us, we have no
reason to expect that anything interesting can be said in response to the
question, "What are its truth conditions?" As we have seen, not all
general conditions on truth issue in distinct conditions for distinct
statenients. Of the illustrative truth conditions that we set out earlier,
only (4) and (5) issue in a peculiar set of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for each statement of the language. The general condition in (4),
when supplemented by the obvious principles of identity; yields the par-
ticular condition for the truth of "roses are red" that roses be red, and
similarly for the other sentences of that small language. Surely
henacerraf does not achieve philosophical satisfaction in the realization
that the conditions of the truth of 'there are at least three perfect
numbers greater than 17' is that there be at least three perfect numbers
greater than 17.
There is one outstanding trump card against which we have had to
finesse. The general set of truth conditione listed in (5) also yields
particular truth conditions that may seem to be of philosophical interest.
I suspect that Benacerraf would insist that it is an achievement to learn
that a condition of the truth of 'roses are red' is that the referent of
the noun phrase 'roses' satisfies the verb phrase 'are red', or to use
another phrasing, that there are objects that 'roses' denotes and that
'are red' applies to them. And he would be correct if only it were
possible to say something interesting both about the reference relation
and about either the relations of satisfaction or its converse, applying
to. Benacerraf recognizes this burden, acknowledging that his favored
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general condition on truth "must proceed through reference and satisfac-
tion and, furthermore, must be supplemented with ~ account of reference
itself" (p. 677, emphasis added). I doubt that it is possible to give an
interesting account of the relations of reference and satisfaction, but
this is not a place again to plead my case. The best explanation of
these relations that I expect philosophers to be able to devise leads
these apparently interesting truth conditions to collapse into those dis-
missed last paragraph. The only theoretically grounded condition of the
truth of 'roses are red' in particular will, I believe, turn out to be
just what that sentence says, namely, that roses are red.
Something more cries out to be heard. In recent years the truth
conditions of ~larious particular" propositions or categories of proposition
have been sought more and more often in philosophical contexts which make
it clear that the real quarry is what in former years would simply have
been called the analysis, not of truth, but of the proposition or type of
proposition under consideration. The genesis of this manner of speaking
is entirely innocent; if I seek an analysis of p, I seek analytically
necessary and sufficient '~onditions for p, that is, analytically neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the proposition that p.
That is, I seek the truth conditions of p. However innocent its origin,
the new manner of speaking has the entirely specious advantages of sound-
ing more scientific than the old, of not calling to mind decades of philo-
sophical agonizing over the nature of analysis, of falsely insinuating
itself into the domain of the theory of reference, and of not associating
itself with the widely discredited analytic-synthetic distinction. There
are real advantages in sticking with the old terminology, including the
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obverse of each of these' counterfeit ones. We all know what is at stake
in the call for a philosophical analysis. Our agony over the nature of
philosophical analysis has not been for nothing, and we should not lightly
cast off its fruits. Even philosophical failure results in an enlarge-
ment of philosophical understanding.
VI. THE THEORY OF TRUTH FOR MATHEMATICAL STATEMENTS
Over the course of the last five sections I have distinguished the
notion of a theory of truth from notions of other kinds of semantica!
accounts, including accounts of logical form and accounts of important
semantical properties of singular terms and quantifiers. I have also
disparaged the notion of an arbitrary statement of the truth conditions
of a proposition. Not only have I maintained conceptual distinctions
among these notions, but I have argued that no comprehensive semantic
theory for the language of mathematics (or for any other language of any
complexity) that includes components answering to each of these notions
will be developed. In fact I have urged that none of these kinds of
accounts forms any very important part of any of the others. Through all
of this I have said very little about what I take a theory of truth to
be. Yet, I have sought to put the notion of a theory of truth at center
stage. In fact, I have said that the most intelligible rendering of
Benacerraf's semantical condition is that a satisfactory philosophy of
mathematics must include an account of truth for the sentences in which
mathematical propositions are expressed. It is time now to turn to the
notion of a theory of truth. In this section I first explain what I mean
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by a theoretical definition of truth, in order to distinguish it from an
arbitrary condition on truth. Then I defend the theoretical definition
of truth formulated by Tarski, as fulfilling Benacerraf's requirement of
an account of truth for mathematics.
A. Theoretical Definitions
When Benacerraf speaks of an "account" of truth, I talc.e him to mean
25
a philosophical elucidation or analysis of the concept of truth. I
believe that the preferable form of elucidation of a concept in philosophy,
as 1n other forms of discourse, is a definition that is part of a larger
theory. When I speak of a definition, I mean a theoretical proposition
of the form,
For any sentence s expressing a proposition of
mathematics, s is true if and only if $(s),
where '~(S)I stands for a sentence of some language in which the theore-
tical claim is expressed, open only in the variable's'. For the sake of
generality, we should embellish the form of the theoretical definition to
provide for falsity as well, giving,
For any sentence s expressing a proposition of
mathematics, s is true if and only if ~(s), and
s is false if and only if ~(s).
25Yet I am not confident in attributing to Benacerraf any particular
view about so controversial a topic as what a philosophical elucidation
consists in. I expound a view of my own in what follows without finding
any definite suggestion of it in Benacerraf's article.
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Many would presume without further ado that what replaces '~(s)' should
simply be the negation of what replaces t~(s)t, but we need not so commit
ourselves.
In supposing that this definition constitutes a theoretical claim,
I suppose that from the truth definition, perhaps together with some
other theoretical propositions, there will follow important generaliza-
tiona that we all accept, involving the notion of truth, as well as
generalizations of interest that we have not otherwise been able to
justify to our satisfaction. Generalizations of the first sort might
well include what Dummett calls the Principle of Exclusion, that is, the
principle that no sentence (here, of mathematics) is both true and
26false, as well as other uncontroversial laws of logic or semantics.
Examples of the second sort of generalization are the (semantic) com-
pleteness of a particular system of formal derivability or more contro-
versial principles of logic or semantics. In short, in order to qualify
as a theoretical definition, the truth definition must be theoretically
productive and theoretically interesting.
I also suppose that the truth defin~tion, in order to be a theore-
tical claim, will have an epistemological status characteristic of theo-
retical propositions. It must be well-supported by evidence or other
epistemologically justifying" features. Typically, theoretical proposi-
tiona are justified by reference to their consequences. A definition
26 Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1978), p. xix. This is the semantic principle correspond-
ing to the Law of Contradiction.
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that yielded widely accepted semantic generalizations, as lately outlined,
would thereby grow in plausibility. But consequences involving truth of
specific form, if obvious and intuitively central to the concept of truth,
would equally contribute to the justification of the definition. By plac-
ing a premium on consequences that are intuitively bound up with the very
notion of truth, we avoid depending on consequences, however obvious,
whose evidence rests on entirely extraneous considerations, for example,
that God knows everything or that two epistemologically unrelated propo-
sitions have the same truth value. If there are other, perhaps more
elusive, features characteristic of epistemologically well-supported
theories--I·think of elegance, simplicity, initial plausibility--the
truth definition must, in order to qualify as a theoretical definition,
exhibit them as well.
I believe that it is this theoretical character that would distin-
guish a definition of truth from other generalizations of the same form
that, as we would ordinarily say, merely happen to hold. It need have no
other special epistemological character such as ~ priority. And it need
have no special metaphysical or semantic status such as necessity or
analyticity.
Perhaps we should linger a moment on this question. In defining a
concept, or classically in providing a philosophical analysis of it, one
has in many contexts been expected to explicate its meaning. In doing so
one would supply an equivalent that would preserve truth even in inten-
sional contexts. I make no pretense that the kind of elucidative def-
inition I am defending has this character. Indeed the paradox of analy-
sis shows that this expectation is absurd for ordinary belief contexts.
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A better model is provided by scientific definitions; no one supposes
that the theoretical definitions of scientific terms like 'kinetic energy'
or 'entropy' preserve truth under substitution in belief contexts. Never-
theless, if we are to he seen as giving a philosophical elucidation, not
merely (1) a scientific theory, shouldn't something stronger than exten-
sional equivalence be required? Of course I have required something
stronger than extensional equivalence, but is what I have required enough?
Shouldn't truth be preserved at least in modal contexts for the account
to qualify as a philosophical account? Well, whatever you think of this
requirement in general, there is some interest in seeing why it quite
possibly cannot be fulfilled in this case.
Truth values are not likely to be preserved under substitutions of
definiens of the sort we have considered into modal contexts. This is
not a result of some deficiency in the truth definition as such, but
rather is a result of proceeding by defining truth for sentences in the
first place. In order for modal substitutions to preserve truth, this
stronger version of the definition must obtain:
Necessarily, for any sentence s expressing a proposition
of mathematics, s is true if and only if ~(s), and s is
false if and only if ~(s).
The difficulty immediately suggests itself that a sentence might under
different circumstances have a different meaning than it in fact has,
Thus, if, contrary to fact, '5 + 7 = 12' meant that four times three is
greater than seventeen, the proferred account of truth would very pos-
sibly fail. Some have replied to this worry by observing that in speci-
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fying a sentence of a language we specify not merely an alphabetic or
phonetic string, not merely a syntactic object, but we specify an inter-
pretation as well. On this view every expression that is part of a 1an-
guage has its meaning essentially. However plausible this may be, it is
not quite enough to guarantee the stronger (modal) version of the truth
definition. The reason is that on some views fixing the meaning of a
sentence may not be enough to fix its truth value, because it may not be
enough to fix the proposition that the sentence expresses. (Whether or
not he intended them this way, a particular way of looking at Putnam's
examples, "Water is H20" and "Cats are animals", will yield the point I
27
want here. ) Setting this worry to rest would require an even stronger
claim, namely, that every sentence expresses the proposition it does
essentially. I see no way to argue for this claim; in fact it seems
quite i~plausible to me. Many sentences express different propositions
from occasion to occasion of utterance. It·-is true that we can specify
languages whose sentences are complete (or eternal) in the sense that a
sentence in fact expr'esses the same proposition on every occasion of
utterance. But the task of specifying even a fully meaningful language
whose sentences express the same propositions despite however great vari-
ations of use and social arrangement and scienfific fact I do not know
how even to begin. Furthermore, even if it did turn out that for some
languages, each sentence expresses the proposition it does essentially,
27 See Hilary Putnam, "It Ain't Necessarily So," in his Mathematics,
Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and
"The Meaning of ~'!Meatiing'," in his Mind , __ Language and Reality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975).
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we have no guarantee that among them would be languages in which the
propositions of mathematics could be expressed.
A definition of truth for sentences in which mathematical proposi-
tions are expressed could avoid this entire problem in only one way. The
definiens would have to be complex in a way that enabled its verdict on
truth value to vary in concert" with all possible variations in the propo-
sitions expressed by sentences in the domain of the definition. In effect
this would require the definition of truth for sentences to include an
account of the relation between a sentence and the proposition it ex-~' ,
presses. That is to say, a definition of the relation of expressing
would have to be embedded in the definition of truth. Yet that relation
is, I believe, more opaque than any other in the whole domain of semantics.
In fact, avoiding the perplexities that it raises primarily motivates our
settling for a theory of truth whose domain is sentences in the first
place.
B. Tarski's Theoretical Definition of Truth
To return to our central concern, I am suggesting that in following
Penacerraf we require of a satisfactory philosophy of mathematics a defi-
nition of truth of the (nonmodal) form indicated, which is theoretical in
the sense I have explained, though it be neither ~ priori, necessary, nor
analytic. Just this much would not seem to satisfy Benacerraf though,
for we observed him to require that "the theory of mathematical truth be
in conformity with a g~neral theory of truth--a theory of truth theories,
if you like" (p. 666). Benacerraf seems to be worried that the sentences
held to be mathematically true on the basis of the proffered account will
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turn out not really to be true at all. I am baffled as to what Benacer-
raf has in mind and so am uncertain how to satisfy him on this score. I
certainly hope that whatever it is that he is looking for, Benacerraf
would be satisfied, with regard to his semantical requirement, by a theo-
ry of truth of the kind we have envisioned for a larger language that
contained the language of mathematics as a proper part. Given a way of
distinguishing the sentences of mathematics from the other sentences, say
by their terminology, the account of mathematical truth could simply have
it that a sentence was mathematically true just in case it was true, and,
what is more, was a sentence of mathematics. 28 Presumably this would in-
sure that truth in mathematics is like truth elsewhere. Perhaps we
should worry about how large the larger language would have to be; even
if its expressive power went beyond mathematics, it might not go far
enough beyond to quell Benacerraf's worries. Some might wish that it be
so large as to express every proposition whatever. If sq they will be
disappointed, for I am certain, though I will not argue for it here, that
in no language can we say everything there is to be said.
Perhaps Benacerraf recognizes this and would instead seek a theory
of ~ruth that was general in that it ranged over the sentences of all
28 There is a certain impropriety in speaking. of the language of
mathematics where what is meant is some proper part of a larger language.
There is such thing as mathematical language, in that there are languages--
formal languages--all of whose well-formed sentences express propositions
purely of mathematics and all of whose terms are recognizably mathe-
matical terms. Yet obviously any subset of the grammatical sentences of
English--purporting to be the methematica1 fragment--either will include
sentences some of whose truth-functional components have no mathematical
terminology or will exclude sentences some of whose truth-functional com-
ponents have exclusively mathematical terminology. Be this as it may, it
poses no more of a problem for the proffered account of mathematical
truth than it does for any other.
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languages or, if it be possible for one sentence to occur in more than
one language and differ in truth value over the different occurrences,
a theory of truth that was general though relative in that it related all
sentences to all their containing languages in respect of truth. I be-
lieve and have argued elsewhere that there is no reason to expect that a
29general theory of truth of either form can be developed. To consider
that issue in more detail would take us too far afield.
Perhaps a more modest achievement would satisfy Benacerraf. This
would be a theory of truth for a language confined to expressing mathe-
matiea! propositions, say the language of Principia Mathematica or a 1an-
guage for Peano arithmetic, which was structurally similar to theories of
truth for other languages, though these languages be similarly confined
in their expressive power. Perhaps we should require that some of these
other languages have the power to express nonmathematical propositions,
for example, propositions of physics or of economics. If this much would
satisfy Benacerraf's requirement for a semantics for mathematics, it has,
I believe, quite ably been fulfilled by Tarski's theory of truth. (One
qualification suggests itself. I do not know of a specific example of a
theory of truth for a nonmathematical language that is structurally simi-
lar to Tarski's theory, that is, I cannot cite one in the philosophical
literature. Yet I have no doubt that one could easily be constructed.)
Besides working in parallel ways for both mathematical and nonmathe-
matieal languages, the Tarski definition has another virtue, which direct-
1y answers Benacerraf's concern that the concept being defined turn out
29 In "Field's Theory of Truth." See pp. 70-76, above.
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to be genuine truth. As might be expected, what I here refer to is its
fulfillment of what Tarski called the condition of material adequacy.
The Tarski definition, together with supporting syntactical and logical
propositions, entails all instances of Tarski's so-called Convention T,
These are the disquotational paradigms exemplified by the now notorious
case,
'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.
We have already seen that intuitively obvious consequences certify a
definition as a genuinely theoretical claim, giving it the kind of epis-
temological support that is characteristic of theoretical claims. But
these consequences do more. They articulate what is most central in our
ordinary understanding of truth, namely, that for any sentence to be
true, the state of affairs it describes must actually prevail. Unlike
the latter articulation, which depends on dubiously metaphorical (or ten-
dentiously metaphysical) phrasing, these consequences articulate that
central idea in a metaphysically innocuous way. This theoretical struc-
ture seems utterly impossible unless what is being captured by the defi-
nition is indeed truth. And Benacerraf's worries are thereby laid to
rest.
Of course Benacerraf is aWRre of Tarski's theory. Having set out
his semantical condition, he says, "I take it that we have only one such
account: Tarski's, and that its essential feature is to define truth in
terms of reference (or satisfaction) on the basis of a particular kind of
syntactico-semantical analysis of the language" (p. 667). But then he
goes on to say that he believes that fulfilling the semantical requirement
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in this way "is inconsistent with all the accounts that I [Benacerraf]
have termed 'combinatorial'" (p. 667). Why is this 80? Benacerraf's
argument for it fails completely to convince me. He mounts an argument
only in his closing paragraphs and directs it only to a particular com~
binatorial view, namely, conventionalism. Even this narrow argument is
difficult to follow.
Rather than lingering over Benacerraf's argument that Tarski's theo-
ry is incompatible with combinatorial views, I have chosen to address
this issue conversely. Benacerraf has deemed the standard semantics, by
which he means something at least structurally similar to the Tarski
theory, to be the friend of the standard, or Platonistic, philosophy of
mathematics. And he has insisted that anti-Platonistic philosophies of
mathematics are incompatible with the standard semantics. The question
naturally suggests itself, does Tarski's theory of truth entail, or more
weakly, lend evidential support to Platonistic views in the philosophy of
mathematics? It is that question to which we direct our attention in the
next section.
VII. PLATONISM AND TRUTH
It is commonly believed that an acceptance of Tarski's theory of
truth for mathematical languages carries with it an acceptance of mathe-
matical Platonism. Mark Steiner opens his discussion of Platonism with
the following representative remarks:
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According to ontological Platonism, the truths of mathematics
describe infinitely many real mathematical objects. Since the
number of material objects may very well be finite, most mathe-
matical objects could not be material ••• Furthermore, the
only way that mathematical statements could be true is by des-
cribing such mathematical objects (see Tarski, "The Concept of
Truth in Formalized Languages," ••• ). It follows, then, that
whether (ontological) Platonism is tenable is the same question
as whether the axioms of mathematics are true. This conclusion
puts ontological Platonism in a very favorable light. 3D
Evidently Steiner believes that under Tarski's definition of truth, the
axioms of mathematics can turn out to be true only under a Platonistic
conception of those axioms. In other words, given the Tarski account of
truth, we reject Platonism only at pain of denying truth to even the most
fundamental and evident mathematical statements.
It is the burden of this section to determine whether this con~on
belief, that Platonism is implicated in Tarski's theory, is well-founded.
Of course doing so requires us to get clear about what philosophical doc-
trines comprise Platonism. I have found several different doctrines put
forward in the name of Platonism, some superficial and others of subtlety
and interest. The superficial doctrines can be quickly set aside; there
is not even prima facie reason to infer them from a theory of truth. The
Platonistic principles that I concentrate on include the principle of the
equivalence of significance and grammaticality, and certain principles
associated with philosophical realism: the Principle of Bivalence, the
principle that truth is independent of verifiability, and the principle
that existential commitment in mathematics cannot be explained away.
These all have the advantage of precision and definiteness. Though in
30 Steiner, Mathematical Knowledge, p. 109.
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each case it is tempting to infer the principle in question from the
Tarski theory, in the end its very precision enables us to reconcile its
demands with the Tarski theory.
Steiner uses the term "ontological Platonism'! to distinguish the
doctrine there characterized from the apparently independent doctrine
that we know the propositions of mathematics, or at least the fundamental
ones, through a special kind of intuition, analogous to sensory percep-
tion of visible and tangible objects. The latter doctrine is often at-
tributed to Godel and is clearly the heir of Plato's views about our
knowledge of the Forms. In keeping with our avoidance of epistemological
issues, we will follow Steiner in separating this epistemological doc-
trine out. Because I am not sure that what remains is an exclusively
ontological doctrine, I will not adopt Steiner's qualifier. ~fuat, for
our purposes, Platonism consists in remains to be explained, but we have
31determined that we do not mean an epistemological doctrine.
What then is the doctrine that is supposed to follow from Tarski's
theory of truth? Steiner's characterization, that mathematical state-
ments "describe infinitely many real mathematical objects" clearly needs
some elaboration. What he seems to emphasize, that there are infinitely
many things in the domain of mathematics, is no consequence of Tarski's
truth definition. It seems to me not to be, properly speaking, a part of
31 I take it that no one is tempted to believe that the epistemolog-
ical doctrine is a consequence of Tarski's theory of truth, unless it be
by way of some other Platonistic doctrines. Both Steiner and Benacerraf
do strongly suggest that epistemological Platonism is a pretty direct
philosophical consequence, though not a logical consequence, of the doc-
trine here to be considered, whence Benacerraf's dilemma.
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Platonism anyway, because whether there are infinitely many numbers 1s
not a point at issue in the philosophy of mathematics. Everyone agrees
that if there be any numbers at all, there are infinitely many, though
perhaps that infinity is never completed. Perhaps, that is, there is no
infinite set, containing all the numbers.
One popular conception of Platonism focuses on the abstract charac-
ter of mathema.tics. Philip Kitcher says, " Arithmetical Platonism is the
thesis that stacements of arithmetic are true or false in ViI .le of the
properties of objects, the natural numbers, which do not exist in space-
time, and which therefore deserve to be called 'abstract objects,.,,32
It is this aspect of Platonism that is the point of Steiner's argument
from the finitude of material bodies. There are much more convincing ar-
guments that numbers and functions and such are abstract, arguments that
depend on no such questionable assumptions. After all, numbers have no
physical properties; they weigh nothing, have no charge or mass; they
have neither spatial location nor spatial extension. Though they may
quite properly be said to exist now, if at all, and indeed to exist a1-
ways, they are timeless in that they neither come nor go, and, with re-
gard at least to those properties treated in mathematical theories, they
change not at all. All of this marks the numbers as abstract. And I as-
surne that no one would be tempted to deny them these marks of the ab-
stract. Nevertheless, nothing in a Tarski theory of truth for any mathe-
matica! language entails any of this. It says nothing of abstraction or
of weightlessness or of timelessness.
32 Philip Kitcher, "The Plight of the Platonist," Nous, 12 (1978),
119-136; see p. 119.
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So far remarkably little seems to be at stake in the acceptance of
Platonism. In search of a more robust version, we turn to a characteri-
zation by Charles Parsons:
Platonism is the methodological position which goes with philo-
sophical realism regarding the objects mathematics deals with.
Mathematical objects are treated • • • as if the facts concern-
ing them did not involve a relation to the mind or depend in
any wayan the possibilities of verification. • • • This is
taken to mean that certain totalities of mathematical objects
are well defined, in the sense that propositions defined by
quantification over them have definite truth-values. Thus,
there is a direct connection between platonism and the law of
excluded middle. 33
Whatever we might say about the structure of Parsons' remarks, he cer-
tainly mentions some interesting matters.
A. Three Aspects of Platonism
Picking up cues from Parsons, I regard Platonism as the combination
of three doctrines regarding the nature of mathematical theory and its
proper development, not only with respect to ordinary arithmetic, but
more particularly with respect to set theory, transfinite arithmetic, and
analysis--all areas in which the notion of infinity plays a central role.
(1) Platonism holds that well-formed sentences in mathematical 1an-
guages, including infinitary ones, have truth values; some of
them are true and some of them are false. In another way of
putting this, all well-formed mathematical sentences express
propositions.
33 Charles Parsons t "Foundations of Mathematics t " in The Encyc!oj2edia
of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), v. 5, p. 201.
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(2) Platonism defends philosophical realism with respect to mathe-
matical objects.
(3) As a methodological position, Platonism endorses certain forms
of mathematical reasoning that are not universally accepted.
With regard to the first of these doctrines, we must ask whether
the equivalence of significance and grammaticality is forced upon us, or
even lent plausibility, by definitions of truth of the sort proposed by
Tarski. With regard to the second, we must ask what specific principles
are included in philosophical realism, and then ask of each of them the
same questions about its relation to Tarski's theory.
With regard to the third doctrine, Platonism endorses in particular
those forms of reasoning whose appearance of soundness depends on the sup-
position that infinite collections of mathematical objects stand complete
at the moment of their specification, rather than merely representing a
process of collecting or constructing, each step of which, as it were,
consumes a definite period of time, and which will not be completed in
any finite number of steps, and thus will at no time be completed. Two
central examples are Platonism's acceptance of non-constructive existence
proofs and its acceptance of impredicative definitions. No one unfami-
liar with the disputes between Kronecker and Hilbert or between Poincare
and Russell near the turn of this century can fully understand that, far
from constituting arid metaphysical dabates, methodological disagreement
over these forms of reasoning affected the practice of mathematicians in
areas of widest research interest. Nevertheless, exploring this third
aspect of Platonism goes beyond the scope of this study. The mathematical
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issues are both complex and abstruse. And moreover, given that these are
issues about the legitimate forms of definition and inference, there is
little reason on the face of it to expect them to be prejudiced by a
theory of truth like Tarski's.
B. Significance and Grammaticality
Is it necessary in any truth definition modeled after the one given
by Tarski for the language of the calculus of classes that all of the
well-formed sentences in the language for which truth is being definep be
given truth values? It was assumed by Tarski that the language for which
he defined truth had a peculiar characteristic which ceases to be obvious
as soon as we call it into question. Under Tarski's definition, ex~res­
sions qualify for the assignment of truth values purely on the basis of
lexicon and syntax. The definition applies to all sentences in the lan-
guage; as is usual in formal languages, any expression constructed out of
a certified vocabulary according to specified recursive rules of sentence
formation qualifies as a sentence .in Tarski's language. In effect Tar-
ski's definition takes it for granted that every well-formed sentence in
his language says something definite, expresses a definite proposition.
Extrapolating from Tarski's assumption, we get the general principle that
any expression that results from the rules of sentence formation for its
language is fully significant and usable for asserting, whether truly or
falsely. A succinct way of putting this is to say that significance goes
with grammaticality.
I deny that it is obvious on a second look that significance accom-
panies grammaticality for the (perhaps unconvincing) reason that many
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philosophers have rejected this correlation of the two notions. They
have had various motivations. Perhaps the most well-known example is
that of the logical positivists with their principle that only sentences
that are either empirically verifiable or analytic are significant. Ac-
cording to the principle of verifiability, a sentence that in principle
"
"cannot be shown to be true or be shown to be false is meaningle~s, though
it may be indistinguishable in point of grammar from fully meaningful
sentences. When someone utters such a sentence, they do not succeed in
asserting anything, and so the question of truth or falsity cannot even
come up.
Despite his familiarity with both the principle of verifiability and
its defenders, Tarski ignored this issue, perhaps because he was defining
truth for a mathematical language, for which the issue of empirical sig-
nificance did not arise. Or perhaps he was out of sympathy with the doc-
trine of verificationism and with the search for philosophical c~iteria
of significance. In any case I know of no explicit articulation of the
view that significance is coextensive with grammaticality before Quine's
34
article, "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics." There Quine rejects
the relational notion of having a meaning, in favor of the ontological1y
uncommitted notion of significance, and sketches a' behavioral criterion
for the latter. The resulting notion is (dimly) recognizable as the fami-
liar notion of grammaticality. But Quine says nothing in defense of this
34 Willard Van Orman Quine, "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics,"
in his From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed., rev. (Cambridge:~ Harvard
University Press, 1980), pp. 47-64. See Sections 2 and 3 of that paper,
particularly pp. 51-52. Incidentally, the paper grew out of a lecture
given in 1951.
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criterion of significance against philosophical challenge; he recommends
it purely in virtue of its behavioral basis.
Presumably our readiness to accept grammaticality as a suf~icient
condition of significance rests on our Fregean preconceptions about
semantic comrositionality. Meaningful parts composed according to sancti-
fled rules yield meaningful wholes. Even so, we are prepared to admit
that in those languages with indexical terms, fully grammatical sentences
might not be assertorically usable in certain contexts. Here opens a
cleavage between being significant in the sense of being fully meaningful
ani being significant in the sense of being fully interpreted or of
saying something definite or of expressing a proposition (pick your favor-
ite). Tarski can justifiably ignore that cleavage because his language
35pointedly excludes indexical and other context-dependent elements. But
can a Tarski theory accommodate a philosophically motivated challenge to
the Fregean preconceptions. Suppose a philosopher of science embraces
a principle of empirical verifiability. Or suppose a mathematician
develops a new language and accords significance only to sentences of the
language that are decided by a favored set of axioms, regarding the others,
however grammatical, as not fully interpreted. Or suppose a philusopher
of mathematics distinguishes the sentences of classical ~athematics that
can be checked by finitary arithmetical methods from the others, arguing
that the others are devoid of literal sense or merely ideal. In adopting
.'
35 Compare "Field's Theory of Truth," pp. 54-56 t above.
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any of these views have we implicity rejected theories of truth of the
Tarski type?
The correct response seems clearly to be no. Providing a criterion
of significance is no job for a theory of truth, nor is embracing a cri-
terion that has been incidentally provided. Tarski truth definitions
typically have the form,
For any sentence s of the language L,
s is true if and only if $(8).
The qualification attached to the initial generalizing phrase serves to
express the criterion of sentencehood and the criterion of significance
at once; any expression that qualifies as a sentence can try to measure
up to the condition necessary for truth expressed by '~(s)'. Yet however
characteristic of Tarski truth definitions this qualifier is, it is inci-
dental to the central idea behind them. A philosophy of mathematics that
denied the sufficiency of grammaticality for significance could merely
elaborate the restriction on the quantifier, making it of the form,
For any sentence s of the language L such that a(s),
\'.-
where 'a(s)' would be replaced by the favored criterion of significance.
So long as that criterion did not smuggle an alternative definition of
truth, it seems clear that the modified definition would still imitate the
crucial features of the Tarski paradigm and would thereby qualify as a
Tarski theory of truth.
Therefore at least the first aspect of Platonism that we have iso-
lated does not follow from Tarski's theory of truth. An opponent of
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Platonism could supply a definition of truth that was structurally similar
to Tarski's definition, one that defined truth in terms of satisfaction,
indeed one that imitated Tarski's in its specification of satisfaction
conditions for the atomic sentences of the language, and yet the defini-
tion could differ in this incidental way of restricting its field of
application to those sentences that were significant according to whatever
criterion of significance the anti-Platonist proposed. His definition
would entail not all instances of the disquotation schema, but rather only
those instances whose sentential referents survive the test of s1goi£1-
cance; happily these would be exactly those instances that were sign1f1-
cant themselves. Of course the definition would not have the consequence
that all well-formed sentences of the mathematical language have truth
values. And thus Tarski's theory lends no plausibility to this aspect
of Platonism, however plausible it may be in itself.
c. Realism ~ith Respect to Mathematical Objects
The second aspect of Platonism that we registered was its defense of
philosophical realism concerning mathematics. The term that is perhaps
most frequently employed in explanations of Platonism is the adjective,
'real'. We saw Steiner speak of mathematics describing "infinitely many
., 36
real mathematical objects. ~ The unrelenting presence of this adjective
inevitably evokes the remarks of Austin in addressing an altogether dif-
ferent philosophical topic. Austin observed that "with 'real' .•. it
36 Steiner, Mathematical Knowledge, p. 109.
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is the negative use that wears the trousers. That is, a definite sense
attaches to the assertion that something is real. , . only in the light
37
of a specific way in which it might be, or might have been, not real."
(Are we to suppose that the numbers, not being real, are complex?)
Having long been sympathetic to his observation, I can hardly let us rest
content with this kind of account of mathematical realism.
An analogy comes to mind, one drawn in many discussions which intend
to flesh out the doctrine of realism with respect to mathematics, Dummett
especially likes to compare the realist's conception of mathematics to the
ordinary conception of astronomy. On this conception there is a realm of
numbers and other mathematical entities, like there is a universe occupied
by galaxies and stars. The mathematician directs his gaze at these mathe-
matical quasars through the telescope of mathematical intuition, making
discoveries about their nature and relationships. As Dummett puts it,
"Mathematical structures, like galaxies, exist, independently of us, in a
realm of reality which we do not inhabit but which those of us who have the
38
skill are capable of observing and reporting on." Drawing ·a somewhat
similar analogy, Wittgenstein spoke (in derision) of "arithmetic as the
39
natural history, or minerology, of numbers."
37 J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1962), p. 70.
38 Michael Dummett, "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic,"
in his Truth and Other Enigmas, p. 229.
39 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics
(1956; rpt. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press~967), p. 116-.- Quoted passage
is from Part III, Section 11.
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Dummett acknowledges that all we have in the astronomical analogy is
40
a metaphor or a picture. Wittgenstein also speaks of his analogy as a
picture, for him one to be excoriated. Indeed everything that the analogy
literally gives us, that is, every way in which mathematics is like astro-
nomy reduces to saying that the favored mathematical propositions are true.
Unfortunately, whatever the nature of truth, this last is not a proprie-
tary doctrine of realism. Steiner is right in seeing our adherence to
this doctrine"at least as regards elementary arithmetical propositions,
as inexorable. And many constructivist opponents of Platonism accord
truth even to certain infinitary propositions, namely those that are demon-
strable by their own austere standards.
In response several worthy attempts have recently been made to state
41precisely wherein realism consists. These attempts converge on two
tenets that are peculiar to and characteristic of philosophical realism
both in the philosophy of mathematics and elsewhere. The first tenet is
what Dummett calls the Principle of Bivalence, the semantic principle that
40 He goes on to ask how to give substance to this metaphor (p. 231ff).
Though his discussion is of interest, it would take us in a path tan-
gential to our own, which circles around Benacerraf's worries.
41 This has been a favorite topic of Dummett's; it ~xplicity emerges
in a number of the essays in Truth and Other Enigmas and lies just
beneath the surface in almost all of the others. Hilary Putnam's essay,
"What Is 'Realism'?" was delivered before the Aristotelian 'Society in 1976
and became Lecture II and half of Lecture III of his John Locke Lectures;
see Hilary Putnam., Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge,
1978). I also recommend the opening chapter of Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein
on the Foundations of Mathematics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980).
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every proposition is either true or false. The second tenet, more
difficult to state and accordingly less uniformly formulated among propo-
nents of realism, is some principle maintaining the independence of truth
from verifiability or demonstrability, even highly idealized versions of
verifiability. These two tenets have recently been taken to be the
literal core of philosophical realism in all its philosophical domains.
They both have the virtues of being precisely expressible and easily com-
pared with the Tarski theory. It must be admitted, however, that these
two tenets disregard a philosophical move that was more widely attempted
earlier in this century than it has been in the past decade. · I am
speaking of the attempt to explain away mathemati.cal objects, to treat
them as fictions, by giving analyses of the propositions of mathematics,
in which there is no existential quantification over anything corresponding
to the numbers or to other mathematical entities. The denial of this
possibility must be acknowledged as another important tenet of realism.
Realism maintains, in short, that numbers are real, not fictions of con-
venience. For our purposes the question of the evidentiary relation of
this aspect of Platonism--its defense of philosophical realism--to
Tarski's account of truth reduces to the question whether these three prin-
ciples--the Principle of Bivalence, the independence of truth from veri-
fiability, and the impossibility of explaining away mathematical objects--
are either logical or philosophical consequences of definitions of truth
of the Tarski type. Let us take up the questions in order.
42 He reserves the title "Law of Excluded Middle" for the schematic
principle, "P or not-P". See Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, p. xix.
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D. The Principle of Bivalence
We have seen that Benacerraf uses G6del as the archetype of his
Platonist philosopher of mathematics; he is supposed to have been driven
by his standard convictions about semantics and by his desire for an
harmoniously related epistemology, to a far-fetched epistemological doc-
trine, in fact to the doctrine that Steiner calls epistemological Platonism.
This portrayal of Godel is somewhat surprising in that Godel says so very
little about semantical issues, or more particularly about the nature of
mathematical truth, in the essay under consideration.' There does
appear an interesting discussion of the meaning of the term tset'~3 Godel
takes seriously, if only for long enough to argue against it, the supposi-
tion that the concept of set, and accordingly the meaning of the term
'set', has not been fully determined by the practice of set theoreticians.
This discussion takes note of the existence of alternative models of the
accepted set-theoretic axioms and thereby implicitly employs notions of
referential semantics. But there is very little attention paid to the
nature of those notions, or even to the question of how to determine which
of the models actually is the domain of the quantifiers in set theory.
What he does do, and this is the central burden of the essay, is to
insist that Cantor's continuum problem is a legitimate mathematical
problem that he expects to be solved by ordinary mathematical methods,
though not to be decided by the currently accepted axioms. (Of course this
43 Godel, "Cantor's Continuum Problem," p. 262 and pp. 265-266.
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last is now a standard result of set theory.} He gives recognizably
mathematical reasons for doubting the truth of the continuum hypothesis,
and then suggests that it will be shown to be false by the discovery of
44
new axioms, which once formulated will "force themselves upon us" in
exactly the way the llsual axioms do.
Godel's only philosophical defense of his belief that the truth of
the contin~um hypothesis constitutes an adequately formulated and legiti-
mate mathematical problem lies in the following passage.
It is to be noted, however, that on the basis of the point of
view here adopted, a proof of the undecidability of Cantor's
conjecture from the accepted axioms of set theory • • . would by
no means solve the problem. For if the meanings of the
primitive terms of set theory • • . are accepted as sound, it
follows that the set-theoretical concepts and theorems
describe some well-determined reality, in which Cantor's
conjecture must be either true or false. Hence its undecida-
bility from the axioms being assumed today can only mean
that these axioms do not contain a complete description of
that reality.45
Abstracted from its epistemological content then what Godel's Platonism,
as expressed in this essay, consists in is simply an adherence to the
Principle of Bivalence, along with the implicit use of our earlier prin'-
ciple that grammaticality insures significance. What GBdel must be urging
is that once any doubts about the meanings of the primitive terms of set
theory have been dispelled, then well-formed set-theoretic sentences,
44 Compare G8del, "Cantor's Continuum Problem," p. 271.
45 Godel, "Cantor's Continuum Problem," pp. 263-264.
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like that articulating Cantor's continuum hypothesis, are guaranteed at
being either true or false. For the continuum hypothesis to "describe
[or misdescribe] some well-determined reality" seems simply to be for it
to be either true or false, despite our inability to determine which on
the basis of current mathematical understanding. And what could GBdel's
confidence about this particular case rest upon, other than a conviction
about the general principle that every proposition is either true or
false? This of course is the Principle of Bivalence.
Of all of the aspects of Platonism that we have isolated, the Prin~
ciple of Bivalence is the one which we are most tempted to conclude from
Tarski's theory of truth. In fact, it (or a very near relative) is a
proud r~qult in Tarski's original paper:
Theorem 2 (The principle of excluded middle).
x, edther x ~ Tr or i ~ Tr. 46
For all sentences
---------
Since a sentence is false on Tarski's definition just in case it is not
true, this theorem is not quite Bivalence as we have stated it. But
on Tarski's definition the negation of a sentence is true if and only
if the sentence is not true, and therefore the Principle of Bivalence
is an immediate consequence of Tarski's Theorem 2. Here, if anywhere, we
seem to have a serious philosophical consequence of Tarski's theory. In
fact this seems to be exactly the kind of general consequence that we were
looking for earlier (p. 127 s above) to qualify a truth definition as a
46 Tarski, "The Concept of Truth," p. 197.
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theoret"ieal definition. The Principle of Bivalence is a generalization
of very great interest that certainly has not been justified to the sat-
isfaction of everyone. In fact what is probably the central controversy
in the philosophy of mathematics turns upon it. Unfortunately this
consequence turns to ashes in our mouths, for when we examine Tarski's
derivation of the Principle of Bivalence, we find that it depends on an
assumption that is equally controversial and that is explicitly rejected
by many opponents of Platonism.
Specifically, Tarski's derivation of Theorem 2 depends on drawing the
inference that if not every infinite sequence satisfies a particular sen-
tence, then there is some infinite sequence that does not satisfy it. Of
course this inference is an instance of one of the central implications of
classical quantification theory, that '-(vx)Fx' implies '(~x)-Fx'.
However central, this implication is perhaps the most disputed resll1t
of classical quantification theory, one that is specifically denied by
typical opponents of Platonism. The cases in which anti-Platonists deny
this implication are in fact the cases where the quantifiers in question
range over an infinite domain. And the case in point is one such, because
any Tarski truth definition where either the language under consideration
has infinitely many variables or its quantifiers range over infinitely
many objects, requires infinitely many satisfaction sequences.
Speaking more formally, the derivation of the needed quantificationa!
implication inevitably employs principles of inference which equally yield
the Law of Excluded Middle properly speaking, that is to say, the logical
schema, 'P or not-P'. It comes as no surprise that the Tarski definition
of truth provides a proof of the Principle of Bivalence only upon the
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employment of rules of inference which ~ediately yield the corres-
ponding logical principle, Excluded Middle. (The rule of inference in
question, in most formalizations, is that licensing the inference of a
statement from its double negation.) Most anti-Platonists have inde-
pendent reasons for objecting to those rules of inference. Disallowing
inferences employing those rules has the perhaps unintended consequence
of rendering the Tarski definition of truth powerless to produce the
Principle of Bivalence and thus rendering it perfectly acceptable to
anti-Platonist opponents of Bivalence.
E. The Independence of Truth from Verifiability
A second tenet of realism that has been emphasized in recent
treatments is the principle that truth is independent of verifiability.
Indeed, it is related to the earlier tenet, the Principle of Bivalence,
in that if not every proposition could be either verified or falsified
even in the fullness of time, the Principle of Bivalence would be lost.
This connection has led some actually to identify these two tenets, to
presume that the independence of truth from verifiability could not be
stated other than as the Principle of Bivalence.
One philosopher who has found an interesting articulation of the
idea that truth is independent of any epistemological properties is
Hilary Putnam. Indeed the proposition that he puts forward is offered
in answer to the question, "What is realism?" His principle is,
A statement can be false even though it follows from our theorI
or from our theory plus the set of true observation sentenced. 7
47 Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 34.
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Here again we have given quite definite content to one of the root ideas
informing philosophical realism.
In surveying a Tarski definition of truth, one might be tempted to
infer from the theory that truth is independent of verifiability, because
neither verification nor any.other epistemological notions (for example,
provability, derivability from favored axioms, confirmation) appear pro-
minently in the definition. (Of course these notions would appear in
that part of the definition intended to determine the truth values of
statements, if such there be in the language for which truth is being de-
fined, that themselves incorporate epistemological terms.) The truth
conditions consist of seemingly objective facts, whatever facts are des-
cribable in the language under consideration.
Yet the absence of epistemological terms in the theory of truth does
not itself guarantee that truth is independent of epistemological notions,
that is to say, it does not rule out the possibility that in fact all and
only verifiable propositions are true. Moreover this might turn out not
to tie- a mere fact, as it were accidental, but a deep philosophical result.
The best way of seeing this point is to consider a mathematical language
in which a complete (that is, decidable) mathematical theory could be
stated. Suppose also that the axioms for this complete theory could
somehow be shown to be self-evident. I have no idea how this might go,
but I am just supposing that some ?hilosophica1 argument for or explanation
of the self-evidence of the axioms could be given. Think for example of
Kant's account of the a priori character of geometrical statements. (Of
course I am not endorsing Kant's view.) In this case truth would not be
independent of verification. In fact all of the sentences of this mathe-
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matiea! language would have completely convincing ~ priori proofs or dis-
proofs~ Nevertheless, a Tarski style theory of trut3 would remain in
place for this language with exactly the same content as it would have
if these happy epiatemological circumstances did not obtain.
There is no reason, at least none captured by the Tarski theory, why
this situation might not hold for all of mathematics. Of course in the
face of G6del's incompleteness proof, either the Principle of Bivalence
or some inferential principles employed in that proof would have to be
given up. But we have already seen that these are not guaranteed by
Tarski's theory either.
It might be objected that in any case the Tarski theory shows that
it is no part of the meaning of truth that truths are demonstrable, that
is to say, that truth is at least not analytically reducible to verifiabi-
lity. The reply is that we have made no claim that the Tarski theory gives
analytically necessary and sufficient conditions for truth, thereby ruling
out other analytically necessary and sufficient conditions. w~at distin-
guishes the definition, on my view, from other sets of truth conditions is
not that it is analytical, but rather than it is theoretical.
On a second look at the formulation of this realist tenet taken from
Putnam, we lose all confidence that the independence of truth from veri-
fiability is a conseque~ce of Tarski's theory, fo~ Tarski says nothing in
particular about the contents of "our theory" and the bearings of its
appearing in our best theory on the truth or falsity of a statment. It
is for precisely this reason that Putnam was pushed to the quoted princi-
ple in formulation of philosophical realism. A few sentences earlier
he says, "Nor is [understanding truth and the logical connectives realisti-
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cally] just a question of accepting Criterion T ... or a question of
48
accepting a Tarski-style truth definition for one's language."
E. Explaining Away Mathematical Objects
One important way of denying the reality of some kind of objects is
by showing how we can say everything that we want to say without quanti-
fying over those objects. We can even accord truth values to those sen-
tences that have the appearance of quantifying over the unwanted objects,
so long as for each of them we give an analysis in which 'no existential
quantification occurs that requires these objects as values for its
variables. Since the sentence resulting can be true, though there exist
none of the problematic things, the original can be said to be true as
well. Since the official version is put forward as an analysis of the
original, the original can inherit its truth value from the official ver-
sion. (Of course this requires a more robust conception of analysis than
Quine's notion of regimentation provides, but no matter.) Here is a way
of having our cake and eating it too. We stick with the standard way of
talking in any but ontologically delicate contexts, secure~l.that our utter-
ances are fully significant and truth-value laden. But when pressed
regarding the ontological force of our existential quantifications, we
fall back on the official versions of the sentences we uttereQ and point
out that there no worrisome quantification can be fOUIld. In this manner
some philosophers explain away the numbers or classes or whatever mathe-
matical entities they wish to condemn.
48 Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 34.
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In the now familiar pattern, this kind of anti-realist doctrine with
respect to numbers or other mathematical entities, might be thought to be
ruled out by a Tarski-style theory of truth. If we explain away the num-
bers, then ordinary arithmetical sentences, with their apparent quantifi-
cation over numbers, inherit their truth values from official equivalents
which do not quantify over the numbers. A Tarski theory says nothing of
this, but blandly assigns truth values by way of the surface syntax of
the ordinary arithmetical sentences, using the clause for existential
quantifiers in the usual way. Hence, the Tarski theory would seem to be
incompatible with the doctrine that they inherlt their truth values from
the ontologically innocent official equivalents, and so would seem to
entail the Platonistic principle that existential commitment in mathematics
cannot be explained away.
Again a closer look reveals nv such consequence of the Tarski theory.
As we have seen before, the theoretically central truth conditions arti-
culated by the Tarski theory may coexist with other sets of truth condi~
tions discovered by attending to different issues. In this case a concern
with ontology leads to that truth condition which we described in terms of
inheritance from the official analysis. So long as that truth condition
yields the same result as the Tarski truth condition, that is,the same
truth value, then they can both hald good. And it must yield the same
result or else we would not accept the analysis as adequate. Of course
the ontologically niggardly philosopher who proposed the analysis in the
first place might well object to the Tarski theory on the grounds of its
own excessive ontology. In response we could invite him to apply his own
methods to the language in which the Tarski theory is expressed.
158
According to that theory, the condition of the truth of the existen-
tially quantified sentence, 'There is a prime between 5 and 11', is that
there exist some sequence of numbers which satisfies the open sentence,
'x is a prime between 5 and 11'. Apparently, for that condition to
hold, there must be sequences of numbers included in the range of the
existential quantification, 'there exist. some sequence of numbers', one
sentence back. But the Tarski truth condition that speaks of sequences
of numbers is not at all unusual in that respect, mathematically speaking.
Lots of mathematical theories speak of sequences of numbers, and if the
proposed method of explaining away the objects of mathematics is any
good, it can be expected to handle such mathematical theories. It can
proceed to handle the Tarski theory in exactly the same way.
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